Arab world - Coalitions of the unwilling
关键词： 阿拉伯，ArabThe Arab world
Coalitions of the unwilling
阿拉伯世界——虽不情愿亦联合
Resistance to the West, and rejection of Israel, are the pillars of a rapidly strengthening alliance in the world's most volatile region
抵抗西方，抵制以色列，以此为基石，一个实力迅速增强的联盟立于世界上局势最为瞬息万变的地区
THE Middle East is no stranger to doom and gloom. The most enduring conflict of the past century, between Israelis and Palestinians, drags on drearily today. The first wars of the 21st century have also unfolded there, in Afghanistan, Iraq, western Sudan and Lebanon.
恶运与忧郁对于中东，一点儿也不陌生。上个世纪最持久的、以色列与巴勒斯坦之间的冲突，如今索然惨淡地悬留未决。21世纪开场的战争也并未在那儿以及阿富汗、伊拉克、苏丹西部和黎巴嫩闭幕。
This being so, the West has a long history of espying new spectres in the region. In the 1950s and 1960s it was Nasser, Egypt's passionate pan-Arabist leader. In the 1970s it was Palestinian terrorism; in the 1980s Khomeini's Islamic revolution; since the turn of the century, al-Qaeda-style mayhem; and now again revolutionary Iran, newly expansionary and perhaps, some day, armed with nukes.
整个情况就是如此，在这个地区，西方时不时就能发现新的“幽灵”，持续这么发现冲突根源的历史甚长。在1950年代和1960年代，这个“幽灵”是纳赛尔（Nasser），他是情绪激昂的埃及“泛阿拉伯主义”领袖。到了1970年代，“幽灵”成了巴勒斯坦的恐怖主义；在1980年代则是霍梅尼的伊斯兰革命；自世纪之交以来，当数基地式的恐怖袭击；时至今日，又是伊朗，又充斥着颠覆的思潮，新近日显扩张之势，也许有一天，会有武装了核武器的“幽灵”在眼前飘荡。
Some of these imagined threats to the global order have been leftist and nationalist, some reactionary and religious, some radical and violent. Yet all have drawn their mobilising power from a single source. They have all been, in essence, resistance movements, inspired by a seemingly unquenchable popular urge to challenge the dominant perceived injustice of the day, whether it be European colonialism, Zionism, American hegemonism or the grip of local governments charged with selling out to the West.
这些推想而知的、对于全球秩序的威胁之中的一些，其始作俑者，是左翼分子与民族主义者，夹杂着一些反动色彩与宗教性，又有点极端主义与暴力色彩。然而，所有能使他们拥有动员力量的原因源流单一。本质上，这些原因都是被一股看似压制不住的群众冲动所激起的、形形色色的抵抗运动，这股冲动旨在挑战当下支配着的、显见的不公，不论其表现为欧洲殖民主义、犹太复国主义、美国的霸权主义或是被指控背叛、投靠西方的地方政府实施的控制。
The most reliable populist cry today remains “resistance”. Sudan's strongman, Omar al-Bashir, blasts the proposed deployment of UN troops in Darfur as the spearhead of a new Western crusade. The Shias and Sunnis in Iraq may be fighting each other for dominance, but the call to “resist” the American occupiers and the weak (though elected) government they sponsor wins passionate followers to both camps. Hizbullah rouses region-wide cheers for bloodying Israel's nose. Clearly, although times have changed, this dynamic has not.
今日平民领袖最可靠的口号依然是“抵抗”。苏丹的强人欧麦尔•巴希尔大肆攻击在达尔富尔地区部署联合国部队的提议，称其为西方新十字军的前锋。伊拉克的什叶派与逊尼派可能正为着领导权彼此争执不下，但有号召“抵抗”美国占领者与其资助的软弱（虽是选举出的）政府，得到了两个阵营中热情追随者的响应。真主党让以色列满鼻流血，整个地区为之鼓舞喝彩。很明显，虽然时代变了，激发民众的动力却依旧不变。
What has changed is that the call to resist now inspires unprecedented enthusiasm, galvanising many disparate political streams at once, secular and nationalist as well as Islamist. The religious element, boosted by the great revival that has swept Muslim societies across the globe, adds a scriptural drumbeat to the call. And lately the impulse to resist has also been strengthened by the failing prestige of traditional countervailing forces—America, the moderate governments in the region and the liberal-minded minority of their citizens.
改变的事实是，如今旨在抵抗的号召鼓舞了空前的参与热情，马上就激励了许多根本相异的政治流派，不但有伊斯兰教者，还有一般的宗教信众和民族主义者。大规模信仰复兴横扫全球穆斯林世界，其煽起的宗教因素给这样的号召加上了来自伊斯兰经典的鼓声。最近，抵抗的冲动也被增强了：作为传统抗衡力量的美国、温和的本地区国家政府及其国民中有自由派观念的少数族群，其声誉日降。
The most obvious sign of the renewed attraction of resistance is the strengthening of a rejectionist front built around the alliance between Iran and Syria. The bond between these countries' very different regimes—one ostensibly secular and Arab nationalist, but in fact an insular, sectarian dictatorship, the other a Shia theocracy—goes back a quarter-century. It was forged in opposition to their mutual neighbour, Iraq, then under the belligerent fist of Saddam Hussein. But the scope of this odd couple's shared interests widened over time. It came to include such goals as keeping Lebanon under Syria's thumb, undermining peace moves between Israel and the Palestinians so as to pressure Israel into disgorging the Golan Heights, occupied in 1967, and making sure America burned its fingers so badly in Iraq that the superpower would not think of similar adventures elsewhere. The Syrian-Iranian alliance also embraces smaller clients who share these goals, such as the main Islamist parties championing “resistance” in Lebanon and Palestine, Hizbullah (the Party of God) and Hamas (which means “zeal”, but is, revealingly, an Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement).
抵抗运动之吸引力再兴的最明显标志就是围绕着伊朗和叙利亚同盟之间建立起的拒绝派阵线增强了力量。回溯四分之一世纪，这些国家间的同盟政权迥异——一个表面上奉行世俗化与阿拉伯民族主义，但事实上是孤立的，由教派集团独裁统治；而另一个则是什叶派神权国家。如此推进建立的同盟意在反对他们共同的邻国伊拉克，那时被好战的萨达姆•侯赛因铁碗统治。这一奇怪的结合随着时间流逝，分享的利益范围也扩展了。其中包括了诸如此类的目标：保持黎巴嫩受叙利亚的支配、暗中破坏巴以和平进程以向以色列施压使其退出于1967年占领的戈兰高地，以及让美国因为其多管闲事在伊拉克大吃其亏以确保这个超级大国不会考虑在别的地方进行类似冒险。叙利亚－伊朗同盟也接纳分享这些目标的小附庸者，例如在黎巴嫩与巴勒斯坦以“抵抗”为宗旨的主要伊斯兰派别，真主党（Hizbullah (the Party of God)）与哈马斯（Hamas）（“哈马斯”意为“热诚”，但就其表露出的行动而言，这是个阿拉伯语中伊斯兰抵抗运动的缩略语）。
Not so long ago, this ungainly partnership was faring poorly. In 1997 Iranians elected a liberal-leaning president, Muhammad Khatami, who seemed intent on shedding his predecessors' confrontational stance. In early 2000, Syria came close to making peace with Israel. (Very close indeed: the actual area of the Golan Heights that remained disputed was a 150-metre-wide strip.) Though hailed as a victory by Hizbullah, Israel's unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon that spring put into question the need for continued resistance by Lebanese guerrillas. At Camp David that summer the Palestinian issue looked set for a resolution that would have rendered quaint Hamas's stated aim of destroying the Jewish state.
不久以前，这一笨拙的伙伴关系颇不走运。1997年，伊朗人选出了有自由派倾向的总统哈塔米，似乎意图放弃其前任各人的对抗姿态。2000年早些时候，叙利亚靠近得几乎要与以色列握手言和了。（实在近得很：戈兰高地上真正有争议的范围仅是150米宽的带状地。）以色列在那年春天单边行动，撤出戈兰高地，真主党将此作为一个胜利而欢呼，尽管如此，以色列的行动还是带来了问题，这使黎巴嫩的游击队认为持续的抵抗是必须的。那年夏天，在戴维营，巴勒斯坦问题看来能安排出一个解决方案，以使哈马斯放弃其宣称毁灭犹太国家的离奇目标。
The Iraq factor 伊拉克因素
The past few years have reversed all these trends. The collapse of the Camp David summit and the eruption of a second, far more violent intifada radicalised the Palestinians, with the result that elections in January of this year produced a landslide for Hamas. Disappointed by the failure of American peace brokerage and America's drift, under the Bush administration, into ever more solid support for Israel, Syria reverted to putting pressure on its Israeli adversary by other means, such as supplying huge numbers of rockets to its Lebanese client, Hizbullah, and offering political sanctuary to Hamas. Radical conservatives in Iran, meanwhile, outmanoeuvred fractious liberals to secure the election, in June 2005, of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner, as president. The supreme leader of Iran's revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who masterminded this coup, quickly proceeded to accelerate the country's nuclear programme.
过去的这些年的形势推翻了所有这些趋向。戴维营峰会失败，巴勒斯坦爆发了第二次“起义”（intifada），不但极端化，且更为暴力，今年一月巴勒斯坦大选的结果为哈马斯带来了压倒性的胜利。美国作中介主导的和平努力以失败告终，也使其不再置身事外，布什政府给予以色列更多坚定的支持，这些都让叙利亚失望，叙利亚回复原来做法，通过其他手段给它的以色列对手施压，这些手段诸如为其黎巴嫩附庸者真主党提供数量巨大的火箭弹以及为哈马斯提供政治庇护。同时，伊朗激进的保守派挫败了易怒的自由派意图获得2005年大选胜利的努力，选出了主张强硬路线的艾哈迈迪内贾德成为新总统。为保守派出谋划策的伊朗革命最高领袖哈梅内伊迅速开始加速实施国家的核计划。
But it was, above all, American policy that boosted the rejectionist alliance. Seeking targets to retaliate against after September 11th, the Bush administration chose to focus on what it labelled “state sponsors” of terrorism. It also lumped together groups such as Hizbullah and Hamas, whose chief agenda was local and nationalist and did not threaten America, with the global terrorist network of al-Qaeda, which had not only declared war on the superpower and on “Jews and Crusaders”, but had also launched hostilities in the most dramatic fashion conceivable.
但最重要的，是美国的政策鼓动出了拒绝派同盟。9.11之后，布什政府就不断寻找报复的目标，将其选择焦点移到了被贴上恐怖主义“赞助国”标签的政权。布什政府也将真主党与哈马斯这样的团体归到一起，这种团体的首要日程是本土及民族主义诉求，并不威胁美国，但基地组织拥有全球恐怖主义网络，基地组织不但对这个超级大国和所谓的“犹太人与十字军”宣战，而且千方百计用最富戏剧性的方式发动恐怖袭击。
In May 2002 the administration added Syria to its “axis of evil” (originally Iran, Iraq and North Korea). This seemed odd at the time, since Syria was providing America with useful counter-terrorism intelligence, and Iran had played a helpful role in the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In 2003 America rebuffed a back-channel Iranian effort to start a dialogue, and later that year slapped sanctions on Syria. “We would have been happy to play the game with them,” sighed a Syrian official at the time. “But they wanted all our cards with nothing in return.”
2002年5月，布什政府将叙利亚加进了其“邪恶轴心”黑名单（最初包括伊朗、伊拉克及朝鲜三国）。这在那时看起来显得古怪，由于叙利亚为美国提供了有用的反恐情报，而伊朗在推翻阿富汗的塔利班政权时曾颇有助益。2003年，美国拒绝了伊朗通过秘密渠道传递开启对话的努力，在那年晚些时候，美国把制裁大棒挥向了叙利亚。一位叙利亚官员在那时叹气说，“我们跟他们玩游戏，一直很高兴，但是他们要我们手上所有的牌却什么也不回馈给我们。”
America's invasion of Iraq, meanwhile, produced a cascade of responses that bolstered the resistance front. The intrusion threatened to drive a physical wedge between Iran and Syria, and so reinforced their mutual need. It emboldened Iraq's Kurdish minority, so raising fears of unrest in Syria's and Iran's own oppressed Kurdish regions. Yet it also empowered the long-disenfranchised Shia majority, a natural bridgehead for Iranian influence. And obviously it removed Saddam Hussein's army, the main military obstacle to the projection of that influence farther afield.
与此同时，美国对伊拉克的入侵产生了源源不绝对抵抗阵线援助的反响。美国有意通过干涉的威胁在伊朗和叙利亚之间产生有形的突破口，因此，正是美国的干涉使得伊朗与叙利亚增强了双方对于彼此的需要。这使得伊拉克的库尔德少数族群更加大胆，因此增加了叙利亚和伊朗的担心，都怕自己国内受压迫的库尔德地区出现骚乱。然而这也使长期被褫夺选举权的什叶派多数族群咸鱼翻身，成为传递伊朗影响力天然的桥头堡。美国的干涉显然也扫除了萨达姆的军队，这个主要的军事障碍本可阻止伊朗影响力更远的投射。
Far more important, the invasion massively buttressed the old rejectionist thesis that America's aim was to divide and rule the Muslim world, to control its oil and to impose Western culture. Here, stirring faded memories, was a Christian army overrunning a Muslim land, in pursuit of what George Bush once carelessly called a “crusade” against terrorism. And here, on the ground, was “resistance” in action, visibly humiliating the intruding warriors.
远更为重要的是，美国的入侵很大程度上支持了老拒绝派论点，即美国的目标是对穆斯林世界分而治之，控制其石油并强加其西方文化。在这里，一支基督教的军队猖獗在一片穆斯林的土地上，激起了人们已经消退的记忆，他们在追求的，是布什曾不经意宣称的对于恐怖主义的“圣战”。也是在这里，在这地面上，“抵抗”正在进行，明明白白，正在羞辱这些侵入的战士们。
In this potent narrative of victimhood Israel, of course, has been held up as a prime example of Western malevolence. But Israel's recent war with Hizbullah added rich fuel. Hizbullah may have provoked the war, but that counted little to the Arab world's television audiences. The tenacity of Hizbullah fighters in defence of their villages added to the lustre of resistance. America's foot-dragging diplomacy, and the hypocritical aloofness of the “moderate” Arab leaders of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who clearly hoped privately for Hizbullah's defeat, seemed to substantiate charges of complicity in the killing.
当然，以色列常常作为受害者出现在令人信服的记事中，一直作为西方恶行的最好例子被一再举出。但以色列最近与真主党发生的战争更加火上浇油。战争可能是真主党引起的，但那对阿拉伯世界的电视观众而言根本不算什么。在保卫村庄的战斗中，真主党战士的顽强为抵抗增添了光彩。美国的外交拖拖拉拉，沙特和埃及“温和的”阿拉伯领导人表现出虚伪的超然姿态，他们心里却清楚得很，私下里都希望真主党被打败，这几方的作为使其屠杀共犯的指控看起来具体化了。
So entrenched now is the idea of an American-led assault on Muslims that virtually any new development is immediately enlisted as further evidence. The fact that terror attacks on Westerners, carried out in the name of Islam, may have raised some hackles goes without mention. So does the fact that countries such as Syria, under the cloak of resistance to the West, continue to promote agendas in Lebanon and elsewhere that have nothing to do with anti-Americanism, but with cementing their own regional influence.
如今，人们都认为美国领导着对穆斯林的袭击，这种想法深入人心，事实上，这种袭击的任何新进展都会立刻被列入更进一步的证据中。以伊斯兰名义发动的对西方人的恐怖袭击，这一事实可能已经引起了一些不必言及就引发的愤怒。诸如叙利亚这样的国家情势亦然，借口抵制西方，而继续在黎巴嫩及其他地方推动的日程与反美毫无关系，而是为了巩固其自身的地区影响力。
Even high-minded Western initiatives now arouse suspicion. The effort to deploy a tougher peacekeeping force in Darfur, where some 200,000 people have been killed and perhaps 1m displaced by a government-assisted slaughter of Darfuris, is widely seen as a subterfuge. The head of the Egyptian lawyers' union, a group which might be expected to defend the rights of the weak, recently declared that the true target of UN peacekeepers was Egypt: Sudan was simply “the next stop after Iraq on the road to the heart of Cairo”.
现在，甚至高尚的西方倡仪都会引起猜疑。达尔富尔地区已经有大约20万人被杀，由政府协助的、对达尔富尔人的屠杀可能已迫使100万人背井离乡，但在此部署一支更强硬的维和部队的努力被广泛视为一个诡计。埃及律师联合会是个期望能为弱势族群保护权利的团体，其负责人最近宣布，联合国维和人员的目标是埃及：苏丹仅仅是“在通向开罗心脏地带的路上，伊拉克之后的下一站”。
The manner of the ceasefire in Lebanon aroused scepticism, too. To many, the insertion of a UN peacekeeping force was aimed at recouping by diplomacy what Israel had lost by fighting. A recent poll found that 84% of Lebanese believe the war was “a premeditated attempt by the United States and Israel to impose a new regional order in the Middle East”. As for the international siege of the Palestinians until they renounce terrorism and accept the right of Israel to exist (see story), the popular perception is that the West, having claimed to support democracy, is now punishing Palestinians for having elected Hamas in a fair vote.
黎巴嫩战争的停战方式也引发怀疑。对于许多人而言，联合国维和部队的介入，其目标在于运用外交手段使以色列重获因为战争失去的东西。一份最近的民调发现，84％的黎巴嫩人认为，这场战争是“美国与以色列的一次有预谋的尝试，意在中东地区强加一个新秩序”。直到巴勒斯坦放弃恐怖主义并接受以色列存在的权利才会解除对其围困（另见别文），流行的观念认为，西方有言在先支持民主，但现在却因为在公平的选举中选出了哈马斯而惩罚巴勒斯坦人。
The shadow of Iran 伊朗的阴影
In the popular mind, attempts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions also mesh neatly with the narrative of Western powers holding back Muslims, or applying double standards. Why can't Iran have nukes if Israel can? Iranian diplomats ably exploit such doubts. So do a growing number of fellow-travellers in regional politics, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Islamist group whose ideological offshoots include Hamas and the main opposition movements in American-allied Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait and Yemen. “Any country should have the right to obtain nuclear technology or even nuclear arms for deterrence, especially if it is being threatened by another nuclear country,” says the Brotherhood's deputy leader, Muhammad Habib.
在一般人的想法中，限制伊朗雄心勃勃的核计划也是与西方国家压制穆斯林，或运用双重标准的说辞精巧配合的。如果以色列可以拥有核武器，为什么伊朗不可以？伊朗的外交官巧妙地利用了这样的疑问。地区政治中的政治同路人持这种想法的团体数量看涨，例如埃及的伊斯兰团体穆斯林兄弟会，其意识形态分支包括哈马斯和摩洛哥、约旦、科威特与也门这些美国盟友国内的主要反对运动组织。穆斯林兄弟会的副领导人哈比比说，“任何国家都有权拥有核技术或甚至用于威慑的核武器，尤其是如果这个国家被其他核国家威胁时。”
Such overt support from the most influential Sunni political grouping is telling. Clearly, Iran's vociferous backing of resistance movements has done wonders—outside Iraq—to heal the age-old rift between the two main branches of Islam. Elsewhere, the example of Hizbullah has—among ordinary citizens, at least—largely dispelled looming fears, first voiced by Jordan's King Abdullah, about the emergence of a “Shia crescent” from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf where Iranian mullahs might call upon millions of minority Arab Shias to rise up against Sunni Muslim dominance. Lebanon's Shia resistance has provided what one senior Western diplomat calls a new political paradigm: “an Arab party that actually means what it says and does what it promises.”
这种公然的支持来自最具影响力的逊尼派政治团体，颇有成效。很明显，伊朗对于抵抗运动的大声支持创造了奇迹——在伊拉克之外——愈合了伊斯兰两大主要分支间长久以来的嫌隙。在别的地方，例如真主党——至少在一般国民之中——已经消除了他们时隐时现的担忧，约旦国王阿卜杜拉首次说到的，关于“什叶派新月”联盟的出现，伊朗的毛拉们（译注：mullah是伊斯兰教徒间对高僧、学者的敬称）可能会号召自地中海至波斯湾这片地区千千万万的阿拉伯什叶派少数族群起来反对逊尼派穆斯林的统治地位。黎巴嫩的什叶派抵抗已经提供了，一位资深的西方外交官所谓的，一个新的政治范例，称其“一个事实上说话算数并兑现承诺的阿拉伯派别。”
Ayatollah Khamenei, brandishing a Kalashnikov and speaking in his fluent classical Arabic in a Friday sermon on October 13th, put the matter more bluntly. Blasting critics of Hizbullah as “cringing hirelings of the Great Satan”, he said that the Iranian-funded militia's victory had made the group so loved that Muslims everywhere felt they had participated in it. The claim is not far-fetched. In far-off Brunei, by the South China Sea, the sultan issued orders for the obligatory performance of special prayers for Israel's defeat. In Egypt, a solidly Sunni country ostensibly allied to America, the two most popular politicians, according to a recent survey, are the Hizbullah chief, Hassan Nasrallah, and President Ahmadinejad of Iran.
在10月13日的一次星期五布道上，哈梅内伊炫耀地挥舞着一把卡拉逊尼考夫枪，用他经典流利的阿拉伯语，把事情说得更直截了当了。他大肆抨击真主党的批评者是“恶魔撒旦卑躬屈膝的雇佣者”，他说，伊朗资助的军事胜利使真主党受到爱戴，所有地方的穆斯林都觉得他们共襄盛举。如此声称并非牵强附会。远在南中国海的汶莱（Brunei），苏丹发出命令，为以色列的失败举行特别的强制祈祷仪式。埃及是个由逊尼派稳固统治的国家，表面上是美国的盟友，根据一份最近的调查，在这里最受欢迎的两位政治人物是真主党首领纳斯鲁拉与伊朗总统艾哈迈迪内贾德。
Understandably, such evidence of a powerful mood-swing on the Arab “street” dismays and alarms pro-Western Arab leaders. It is not simply that the governments of countries such as Egypt and Jordan, which long ago settled their own problems with Israel, fear renewed public pressure to resume “resistance” (ie, war), which is what the Muslim Brotherhood promises if it comes to power. These American allies are hostile to Hizbullah because the group provides a dangerous example of a potent non-state actor armed and supported by neighbours. They abhor the Syrian regime, blaming it for meddling (and murdering) in Lebanon and for undermining efforts to persuade Hamas to recognise Israel. They are spooked by Hamas's electoral success and the possibility of Islamist encroachment much closer to home. The Muslim Brotherhood made impressive gains in Egypt's parliamentary elections last year, and is expected to do equally well in Jordanian polls scheduled for 2007. Morocco, another American ally, also faces elections next year, with analysts predicting a shoo-in for the Islamist opposition.
可理解的是，阿拉伯“路上”强劲的情绪推动力产生的这种迹象使亲西方的阿拉伯领导人觉得沮丧并对其敲响了警钟。不仅仅是诸如埃及与约旦这些很久以前与以色列一起解决他们自身问题的国家政府担心再兴的公众压力继续鼓吹“抵抗”（如，战争），这是穆斯林兄弟会承诺如果他们掌权要做的。这些美国的盟友对真主党心存敌意，因为这个团体提供了一个危险的例子，拥有强大的非国家武装并收到邻国的支持。他们憎恶叙利亚政权，指责其参与在黎巴嫩的干涉（与谋杀）并暗中破坏说服哈马斯承认以色列的努力。哈马斯的选举胜利以及伊斯兰极端分子侵蚀越发临近本土的可能性都吓住了他们。穆斯林兄弟会在去年埃及议会选举中的得利令人印象深刻，预计在2007年约旦排定的选举投票中，兄弟会的表现也会同样不错。美国的另一个盟友摩洛哥也面临明年的大选，分析家们预言伊斯兰反对派十有八九会获胜。
America's shaky friends 美国靠不住的朋友们
As for Iran, Egyptians have never forgiven its revolutionary leaders for naming a Tehran street after one of the assassins of their peacemaking president, Anwar Sadat. Lebanon's shaky governing coalition, now in a stand-off with Hizbullah, sees Iran as the main obstacle to a deal under which Hizbullah might focus on being a political party and give up its arms. Gulf states feel a more direct threat, since many of them host American military bases.
至于伊朗，埃及人永远也不会原谅伊朗的革命领袖将一条德黑兰的街道以一个暗杀缔造和平的埃及总统萨达特的凶手名字来命名。黎巴嫩不稳定的执政联盟，如今与真主党不分胜负，视伊朗为与真主党达成协定的主要障碍，按照此协定，真主党会集中注意力于成为一个政党并放弃其武装。由于许多海湾国家都有美国的军事基地存在，他们感受到了一股更直接的威胁。
The rulers of archly Sunni and conservative Saudi Arabia, in particular, have long viewed Iran as a dangerous rival. In the 1980s they blamed it for stirring unrest among the kingdom's large Shia minority, and in response helped bankroll Saddam Hussein's war against the Islamic Republic. During the recent Israel-Lebanon war, when some Saudi youths made the mistake of sticking posters of the admired Mr Nasrallah on their windscreens, Saudi police promptly arrested them.
尤其能伸能曲的逊尼派与保守的沙特阿拉伯统治者长期视伊朗为危险的对手。在1980年代，他们就指责伊朗在王国的大什叶派少数族群中激起骚动，作为回应，他们帮助萨达姆为其发动的对这个伊斯兰共和国的战争提供资金。在最近的以黎战争中，一旦一些沙特的年轻人犯错误将他们仰慕的纳斯鲁拉的海报帖到挡风玻璃上，沙特的警察就迅速将他们逮捕。
The Bush administration has belatedly tried to rally its allies and to bolster such beleaguered figures as the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and the prime ministers of Lebanon and Iraq. But the response has been half-hearted. This loose collection of accommodationist governments is finding it hard to gain traction against the resistance ideal. One problem they face is Israel, whose increasingly harsh operations against Palestinian fighters in the West Bank and Gaza have made it more toxic than ever. Israeli and Arab moderates both want to cool temperatures over Palestine and Lebanon and to contain Iran. But Arabs are uneasy at any hint of an alliance with the Jewish state.
布什政府试图重新团结它的盟友及帮助身陷围攻的人物，如巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯及黎巴嫩和伊拉克的总理，但为时已晚。布什政府得到的回答半心半意。这一迁就主义者政府的松散集合发现要获得对付抵抗理想的吸引力着实困难。他们要面对的一个问题就是以色列，在西岸与加沙，以色列对付巴勒斯坦战士越发严厉的军事行动使以色列较以往中毒越深。以色列与阿拉伯的温和派都想给巴勒斯坦与黎巴嫩的局势降温并限制伊朗。但阿拉伯人对于与这个犹太国家形成联盟的任何一个暗示都感到不安。
America's own refusal to engage directly with the resistance block has polarised and complicated the situation. Discomfort with America grew particularly acute over the Lebanon war, when countries such as Saudi Arabia were forced, by public outrage at Israel's crushing response, to back away from their criticism of Hizbullah for having started the war.
美国自己拒绝了直接与抵抗集团交战，使局势两极分化且错综复杂了。贯穿黎巴嫩战争，对美国的不愉快尤其增长得尖锐，那时诸如沙特这样的国家，由于以色列斩钉截铁的回应引发了公众的义愤，他们被迫从对真主党挑起战争的批评回撤。
Yet, although it may lack the rejectionists' unity of purpose and their popular appeal, the accommodationist axis of American friends is not entirely toothless. Gulf countries now have plenty of oil cash with which to win goodwill by, for instance, rebuilding Lebanon and shoring up the Palestinian economy. Such largesse could prove persuasive, too, in trying to coax Syria away from its tight embrace of Iran, since Syria's economy relies on oil reserves that are fast running out.
然而，虽然由美国的朋友形成的迁就主义轴心可能缺乏拒绝派联合体的目标与广泛的吸引力，但他们并非全无招架之策。海湾国家现有充裕的石油现金，例如，可以借此重建黎巴嫩并支撑起巴勒斯坦的经济以赢得友好。由于叙利亚的经济仰赖其很快就要用尽的石油储备，如此慷慨地援助或许也能为试图好言相劝叙利亚脱离对伊朗紧密附庸的动因作出证实。
They might also make progress, with those on the Arab street who are still willing to listen, by posing the question of whether ordinary people really want to sacrifice lives and treasure in an endless fight against Israel. The answer of large numbers of Lebanese during the recent war was a resounding no. Raghida Dergham, a columnist for the Saudi-owned daily Al Hayat, writes sarcastically that if what she calls the axis of extremism is resolved on war, “we hope it is ready to liberate Palestine and not exploit the Palestinians as a tool for the ideology and hegemony of others.”
他们也可能取得进展，对那些常常上街依然愿意倾听的阿拉伯人提出这样的问题：一般人是否真的想在一场无休无止反对以色列的战斗中牺牲生命与财富？经历了最近这场战争的大多数黎巴嫩人给出的答案会是响亮的“不”。沙特国有日报《生活报》（Al Hayat）的专栏作家Raghida Dergham用讥讽的笔调写道，如果她所谓的极端主义轴心能用战争消解，“我们希望就要解放巴勒斯坦，而非利用巴勒斯坦人使之成为为别人的意识形态与霸权服务的工具。”
This comment pricks at both Iran and Syria. Few Muslims elsewhere are aware that Mr Khamenei, aside from being supreme leader of the revolution and running the powerful intelligence services, also styles himself Leader of the Islamic World. This suggests a much wider agenda than simple “resistance”. As for Syria, while it champions Islamist liberation movements abroad, mere membership of the Muslim Brotherhood inside the country remains a capital crime.
这一评论刺痛了伊朗与叙利亚双方。在别处，且不论哈梅内伊是革命的最高领袖且指挥着强大的情报机构，几乎没有什么穆斯林还觉得他以伊斯兰世界的领袖自居。这暗示着较之单纯的“抵抗”宽泛得多的行动日程。说到叙利亚，随着它追求的伊斯兰解放运动流行开来，在其国内，仅仅拥有穆斯林兄弟会的会员身份依然是一项死罪。
Arab moderates may be able to convince the Bush administration that the best way to ease tension would be for America itself to be more flexible. That would be wise, because the rejectionist front may not be as intractable as it appears. Syria's president has repeatedly signalled that he would shift his position if only some reward, such as a chance to recover the Golan Heights, were offered. Recent polling among Palestinians shows a similar openness to persuasion.
阿拉伯温和派也许能说服布什政府相信，缓和紧张形势的最佳方式可能是使美国自身变得更加有弹性。这可能是明智的，因为拒绝派阵线可能不如它显现出的如此难以瓦解。叙利亚总统一再发出信号，如果为其提供仅仅一些酬赏，例如重新获得戈兰高地的机会，他就会转变立场。最近在巴勒斯坦人中所做的民调显示出对于劝导相似的开放态度。
It is also clear that a powerful sector of Islamist opinion is so fundamentally rejectionist that it will never change. The best the West can do may be to ensure that it does not push more moderates into that camp. It could start by remembering that people choose to “resist” when they feel threatened.
也很清楚的是，伊斯兰极端分子所持的观点中强势的部分根本是拒绝主义的，永远不会改变。西方能做的最好的就是确保不会逼迫更多的温和派加入极端阵营。想想人们一旦觉得受到威胁，他们就会选择“抵抗”，从温和派到极端分子的转变就可能开始。
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“世上本无事，庸人自扰之。”这话的后半句用来形容美国的中东政策倒是很贴切。美国的民选总统小布什，上台之后不改其牛仔个性，到处横冲直撞。9.11之后，更是像一只进入中东的刺猬，虽然浑身都是刺，别人不敢惹，但是目标明显，难免吸引暗箭。
美国用莫须有的罪名除掉了视如芒刺的萨达姆政权。在此之前，在萨达姆的铁腕之下，伊拉克国内还算平静，虽然饱受制裁之苦，但老百姓不至于过着每天担心受到恐怖袭击的日子中。如果愿意的话，可以列举一大堆萨达姆的罪状，虽然如此，萨达姆政权对于伊拉克的稳定依然有所助益，不论其主观目的是否为了萨达姆的统治地位更加稳固。不论伊拉克人愿意或被强制接受萨达姆的统治，只要不是伊拉克人主动发动推翻其统治的革命或是起义，其他使其下台的方式总是遗患无穷的，而美国人的作为，则是下策之一。
美国想控制伊拉克当然不是一天两天的事了，当年就曾对其扶持有加，两国交恶之后，虽然美国失去了对其直接的影响力，但依然通过联合国的制裁对伊拉克指手画脚，也许是发现联合国的制裁依然不能使桀骜不驯的萨达姆就范，也为了能提供这个轮子上的国家源源不断的石油资源。于是，布什政府将其进军伊拉克包装成使伊拉克实现民主，这种外科手术式的运作显然忽略了伊拉克内部复杂的教派矛盾背景，美国人在事前也没有拟订什么周密的后续方案，战事比料想的更早更顺利地结束，这种出乎意料的快感使得美国人显得过分乐观。时至今日，布什的整个班子也越来越不乐观，虽然表面上还嘴硬，但是高层面对媒体采访时的表态则是愈发谨慎了。
德国前总理施罗德最近出了一本回忆录，披露了不少外交内幕。提到布什的时候，说他把他自己的宗教信仰过分掺杂进国家的政策。布什是个虔诚的基督徒，他年轻的时候酗酒、吸毒，皈依基督教之后，把这些毛病统统改掉了，他是个所谓的reborn Christian（重生的基督徒），因此对于自己的宗教信仰笃信不疑，更将其视为能够拯救他人的方法。因此，布什才会不经意间说出了要对恐怖主义发动“圣战”，如果了解布什，就不会奇怪他的这种不经意，也恰恰是这样的不经意，才能显露出其真正的思想所在。
阿拉伯人也许最看不惯的，是布什为代表的这种“文明的傲慢”，对伊斯兰文明的轻视与其时不时透出的敌意。“布什主义”的膨胀，带给世界的大概不是什么乐观的兆头。用枪炮为伊拉克人送来的民主是否能够在伊拉克生根则大有疑问。伊拉克位于中东的中心地带，美国人真会挑地方，不来则已，一来就在这里打了个楔子，也难怪被各种势力背景的恐怖主义分子当靶子了。
恐怖主义的根源当然有很多，但是这些年来，美国的政策无疑是诱发恐怖分子增长的重要原因。布什的以暴制暴，带给美国人更多的不安，虽然9.11之后，美国本土再也没有什么恐怖袭击的事件发生，但这不能带给美国人更多的安全感，仿佛美国人头上悬着一把达摩克利斯之剑，不知道什么突如其来的恐惧又会将大家带入一种无所适从的境地。
对于中东而言，尤其是伊拉克，民选政府软弱无力，恐怖袭击天天在街头上演，如何才能降低恐怖威胁？也许美国从伊拉克撤军能使针对美国人的非议减少，但是，是不是能够使恐怖袭击减少则另当别论。美国除掉萨达姆政权之后，带来了伊拉克国内政治势力的大洗牌，教派冲突因此加剧。美国在伊拉克控制力量的存在，也使得伊拉克的周边国家愈发显出不安，这种不安当然不乏内部极端势力的施压。否则，美国在中东的盟友也不会若即若离。
布什挑起的争端，除了源自其一贯坚持的美国的国家利益，也源自其个性。也许，布什会成为中东人眼里最烂的自由民主推销员。这还不要紧，如果将整个西方拉入其针对伊斯兰世界的种种作为，那么亨廷顿所谓的“文明的冲突”恐怕很难避免，哪壶不开提哪壶，布什的错误前不久也在教宗本笃十六世的身上重演，虽然教宗犯的是一个不大不小的错误，也表示了歉意，但伊斯兰世界依然不依不饶，他们将其视为基督教文明对伊斯兰文明的冒犯，如果每件小事都用放大镜来看，这个世界的未来恐怕不乐观，毕竟，文明的冲突带给人类的，注定是一场浩劫！
布什的任期也只剩下两年，如果年底的中期选举共和党落败，那布什就将成为“跛脚鸭”总统。如果这样，对布什以及共和党而言是挫折，但对世界而言，会不会是一个不大不小的转机？翻译 by 福建李菁
Coalitions of the unwilling
阿拉伯世界——虽不情愿亦联合
Resistance to the West, and rejection of Israel, are the pillars of a rapidly strengthening alliance in the world's most volatile region
抵抗西方，抵制以色列，以此为基石，一个实力迅速增强的联盟立于世界上局势最为瞬息万变的地区
THE Middle East is no stranger to doom and gloom. The most enduring conflict of the past century, between Israelis and Palestinians, drags on drearily today. The first wars of the 21st century have also unfolded there, in Afghanistan, Iraq, western Sudan and Lebanon.
恶运与忧郁对于中东，一点儿也不陌生。上个世纪最持久的、以色列与巴勒斯坦之间的冲突，如今索然惨淡地悬留未决。21世纪开场的战争也并未在那儿以及阿富汗、伊拉克、苏丹西部和黎巴嫩闭幕。
This being so, the West has a long history of espying new spectres in the region. In the 1950s and 1960s it was Nasser, Egypt's passionate pan-Arabist leader. In the 1970s it was Palestinian terrorism; in the 1980s Khomeini's Islamic revolution; since the turn of the century, al-Qaeda-style mayhem; and now again revolutionary Iran, newly expansionary and perhaps, some day, armed with nukes.
整个情况就是如此，在这个地区，西方时不时就能发现新的“幽灵”，持续这么发现冲突根源的历史甚长。在1950年代和1960年代，这个“幽灵”是纳赛尔（Nasser），他是情绪激昂的埃及“泛阿拉伯主义”领袖。到了1970年代，“幽灵”成了巴勒斯坦的恐怖主义；在1980年代则是霍梅尼的伊斯兰革命；自世纪之交以来，当数基地式的恐怖袭击；时至今日，又是伊朗，又充斥着颠覆的思潮，新近日显扩张之势，也许有一天，会有武装了核武器的“幽灵”在眼前飘荡。
Some of these imagined threats to the global order have been leftist and nationalist, some reactionary and religious, some radical and violent. Yet all have drawn their mobilising power from a single source. They have all been, in essence, resistance movements, inspired by a seemingly unquenchable popular urge to challenge the dominant perceived injustice of the day, whether it be European colonialism, Zionism, American hegemonism or the grip of local governments charged with selling out to the West.
这些推想而知的、对于全球秩序的威胁之中的一些，其始作俑者，是左翼分子与民族主义者，夹杂着一些反动色彩与宗教性，又有点极端主义与暴力色彩。然而，所有能使他们拥有动员力量的原因源流单一。本质上，这些原因都是被一股看似压制不住的群众冲动所激起的、形形色色的抵抗运动，这股冲动旨在挑战当下支配着的、显见的不公，不论其表现为欧洲殖民主义、犹太复国主义、美国的霸权主义或是被指控背叛、投靠西方的地方政府实施的控制。
The most reliable populist cry today remains “resistance”. Sudan's strongman, Omar al-Bashir, blasts the proposed deployment of UN troops in Darfur as the spearhead of a new Western crusade. The Shias and Sunnis in Iraq may be fighting each other for dominance, but the call to “resist” the American occupiers and the weak (though elected) government they sponsor wins passionate followers to both camps. Hizbullah rouses region-wide cheers for bloodying Israel's nose. Clearly, although times have changed, this dynamic has not.
今日平民领袖最可靠的口号依然是“抵抗”。苏丹的强人欧麦尔•巴希尔大肆攻击在达尔富尔地区部署联合国部队的提议，称其为西方新十字军的前锋。伊拉克的什叶派与逊尼派可能正为着领导权彼此争执不下，但有号召“抵抗”美国占领者与其资助的软弱（虽是选举出的）政府，得到了两个阵营中热情追随者的响应。真主党让以色列满鼻流血，整个地区为之鼓舞喝彩。很明显，虽然时代变了，激发民众的动力却依旧不变。
What has changed is that the call to resist now inspires unprecedented enthusiasm, galvanising many disparate political streams at once, secular and nationalist as well as Islamist. The religious element, boosted by the great revival that has swept Muslim societies across the globe, adds a scriptural drumbeat to the call. And lately the impulse to resist has also been strengthened by the failing prestige of traditional countervailing forces—America, the moderate governments in the region and the liberal-minded minority of their citizens.
改变的事实是，如今旨在抵抗的号召鼓舞了空前的参与热情，马上就激励了许多根本相异的政治流派，不但有伊斯兰教者，还有一般的宗教信众和民族主义者。大规模信仰复兴横扫全球穆斯林世界，其煽起的宗教因素给这样的号召加上了来自伊斯兰经典的鼓声。最近，抵抗的冲动也被增强了：作为传统抗衡力量的美国、温和的本地区国家政府及其国民中有自由派观念的少数族群，其声誉日降。
The most obvious sign of the renewed attraction of resistance is the strengthening of a rejectionist front built around the alliance between Iran and Syria. The bond between these countries' very different regimes—one ostensibly secular and Arab nationalist, but in fact an insular, sectarian dictatorship, the other a Shia theocracy—goes back a quarter-century. It was forged in opposition to their mutual neighbour, Iraq, then under the belligerent fist of Saddam Hussein. But the scope of this odd couple's shared interests widened over time. It came to include such goals as keeping Lebanon under Syria's thumb, undermining peace moves between Israel and the Palestinians so as to pressure Israel into disgorging the Golan Heights, occupied in 1967, and making sure America burned its fingers so badly in Iraq that the superpower would not think of similar adventures elsewhere. The Syrian-Iranian alliance also embraces smaller clients who share these goals, such as the main Islamist parties championing “resistance” in Lebanon and Palestine, Hizbullah (the Party of God) and Hamas (which means “zeal”, but is, revealingly, an Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement).
抵抗运动之吸引力再兴的最明显标志就是围绕着伊朗和叙利亚同盟之间建立起的拒绝派阵线增强了力量。回溯四分之一世纪，这些国家间的同盟政权迥异——一个表面上奉行世俗化与阿拉伯民族主义，但事实上是孤立的，由教派集团独裁统治；而另一个则是什叶派神权国家。如此推进建立的同盟意在反对他们共同的邻国伊拉克，那时被好战的萨达姆•侯赛因铁碗统治。这一奇怪的结合随着时间流逝，分享的利益范围也扩展了。其中包括了诸如此类的目标：保持黎巴嫩受叙利亚的支配、暗中破坏巴以和平进程以向以色列施压使其退出于1967年占领的戈兰高地，以及让美国因为其多管闲事在伊拉克大吃其亏以确保这个超级大国不会考虑在别的地方进行类似冒险。叙利亚－伊朗同盟也接纳分享这些目标的小附庸者，例如在黎巴嫩与巴勒斯坦以“抵抗”为宗旨的主要伊斯兰派别，真主党（Hizbullah (the Party of God)）与哈马斯（Hamas）（“哈马斯”意为“热诚”，但就其表露出的行动而言，这是个阿拉伯语中伊斯兰抵抗运动的缩略语）。
Not so long ago, this ungainly partnership was faring poorly. In 1997 Iranians elected a liberal-leaning president, Muhammad Khatami, who seemed intent on shedding his predecessors' confrontational stance. In early 2000, Syria came close to making peace with Israel. (Very close indeed: the actual area of the Golan Heights that remained disputed was a 150-metre-wide strip.) Though hailed as a victory by Hizbullah, Israel's unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon that spring put into question the need for continued resistance by Lebanese guerrillas. At Camp David that summer the Palestinian issue looked set for a resolution that would have rendered quaint Hamas's stated aim of destroying the Jewish state.
不久以前，这一笨拙的伙伴关系颇不走运。1997年，伊朗人选出了有自由派倾向的总统哈塔米，似乎意图放弃其前任各人的对抗姿态。2000年早些时候，叙利亚靠近得几乎要与以色列握手言和了。（实在近得很：戈兰高地上真正有争议的范围仅是150米宽的带状地。）以色列在那年春天单边行动，撤出戈兰高地，真主党将此作为一个胜利而欢呼，尽管如此，以色列的行动还是带来了问题，这使黎巴嫩的游击队认为持续的抵抗是必须的。那年夏天，在戴维营，巴勒斯坦问题看来能安排出一个解决方案，以使哈马斯放弃其宣称毁灭犹太国家的离奇目标。
The Iraq factor 伊拉克因素
The past few years have reversed all these trends. The collapse of the Camp David summit and the eruption of a second, far more violent intifada radicalised the Palestinians, with the result that elections in January of this year produced a landslide for Hamas. Disappointed by the failure of American peace brokerage and America's drift, under the Bush administration, into ever more solid support for Israel, Syria reverted to putting pressure on its Israeli adversary by other means, such as supplying huge numbers of rockets to its Lebanese client, Hizbullah, and offering political sanctuary to Hamas. Radical conservatives in Iran, meanwhile, outmanoeuvred fractious liberals to secure the election, in June 2005, of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner, as president. The supreme leader of Iran's revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who masterminded this coup, quickly proceeded to accelerate the country's nuclear programme.
过去的这些年的形势推翻了所有这些趋向。戴维营峰会失败，巴勒斯坦爆发了第二次“起义”（intifada），不但极端化，且更为暴力，今年一月巴勒斯坦大选的结果为哈马斯带来了压倒性的胜利。美国作中介主导的和平努力以失败告终，也使其不再置身事外，布什政府给予以色列更多坚定的支持，这些都让叙利亚失望，叙利亚回复原来做法，通过其他手段给它的以色列对手施压，这些手段诸如为其黎巴嫩附庸者真主党提供数量巨大的火箭弹以及为哈马斯提供政治庇护。同时，伊朗激进的保守派挫败了易怒的自由派意图获得2005年大选胜利的努力，选出了主张强硬路线的艾哈迈迪内贾德成为新总统。为保守派出谋划策的伊朗革命最高领袖哈梅内伊迅速开始加速实施国家的核计划。
But it was, above all, American policy that boosted the rejectionist alliance. Seeking targets to retaliate against after September 11th, the Bush administration chose to focus on what it labelled “state sponsors” of terrorism. It also lumped together groups such as Hizbullah and Hamas, whose chief agenda was local and nationalist and did not threaten America, with the global terrorist network of al-Qaeda, which had not only declared war on the superpower and on “Jews and Crusaders”, but had also launched hostilities in the most dramatic fashion conceivable.
但最重要的，是美国的政策鼓动出了拒绝派同盟。9.11之后，布什政府就不断寻找报复的目标，将其选择焦点移到了被贴上恐怖主义“赞助国”标签的政权。布什政府也将真主党与哈马斯这样的团体归到一起，这种团体的首要日程是本土及民族主义诉求，并不威胁美国，但基地组织拥有全球恐怖主义网络，基地组织不但对这个超级大国和所谓的“犹太人与十字军”宣战，而且千方百计用最富戏剧性的方式发动恐怖袭击。
In May 2002 the administration added Syria to its “axis of evil” (originally Iran, Iraq and North Korea). This seemed odd at the time, since Syria was providing America with useful counter-terrorism intelligence, and Iran had played a helpful role in the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In 2003 America rebuffed a back-channel Iranian effort to start a dialogue, and later that year slapped sanctions on Syria. “We would have been happy to play the game with them,” sighed a Syrian official at the time. “But they wanted all our cards with nothing in return.”
2002年5月，布什政府将叙利亚加进了其“邪恶轴心”黑名单（最初包括伊朗、伊拉克及朝鲜三国）。这在那时看起来显得古怪，由于叙利亚为美国提供了有用的反恐情报，而伊朗在推翻阿富汗的塔利班政权时曾颇有助益。2003年，美国拒绝了伊朗通过秘密渠道传递开启对话的努力，在那年晚些时候，美国把制裁大棒挥向了叙利亚。一位叙利亚官员在那时叹气说，“我们跟他们玩游戏，一直很高兴，但是他们要我们手上所有的牌却什么也不回馈给我们。”
America's invasion of Iraq, meanwhile, produced a cascade of responses that bolstered the resistance front. The intrusion threatened to drive a physical wedge between Iran and Syria, and so reinforced their mutual need. It emboldened Iraq's Kurdish minority, so raising fears of unrest in Syria's and Iran's own oppressed Kurdish regions. Yet it also empowered the long-disenfranchised Shia majority, a natural bridgehead for Iranian influence. And obviously it removed Saddam Hussein's army, the main military obstacle to the projection of that influence farther afield.
与此同时，美国对伊拉克的入侵产生了源源不绝对抵抗阵线援助的反响。美国有意通过干涉的威胁在伊朗和叙利亚之间产生有形的突破口，因此，正是美国的干涉使得伊朗与叙利亚增强了双方对于彼此的需要。这使得伊拉克的库尔德少数族群更加大胆，因此增加了叙利亚和伊朗的担心，都怕自己国内受压迫的库尔德地区出现骚乱。然而这也使长期被褫夺选举权的什叶派多数族群咸鱼翻身，成为传递伊朗影响力天然的桥头堡。美国的干涉显然也扫除了萨达姆的军队，这个主要的军事障碍本可阻止伊朗影响力更远的投射。
Far more important, the invasion massively buttressed the old rejectionist thesis that America's aim was to divide and rule the Muslim world, to control its oil and to impose Western culture. Here, stirring faded memories, was a Christian army overrunning a Muslim land, in pursuit of what George Bush once carelessly called a “crusade” against terrorism. And here, on the ground, was “resistance” in action, visibly humiliating the intruding warriors.
远更为重要的是，美国的入侵很大程度上支持了老拒绝派论点，即美国的目标是对穆斯林世界分而治之，控制其石油并强加其西方文化。在这里，一支基督教的军队猖獗在一片穆斯林的土地上，激起了人们已经消退的记忆，他们在追求的，是布什曾不经意宣称的对于恐怖主义的“圣战”。也是在这里，在这地面上，“抵抗”正在进行，明明白白，正在羞辱这些侵入的战士们。
In this potent narrative of victimhood Israel, of course, has been held up as a prime example of Western malevolence. But Israel's recent war with Hizbullah added rich fuel. Hizbullah may have provoked the war, but that counted little to the Arab world's television audiences. The tenacity of Hizbullah fighters in defence of their villages added to the lustre of resistance. America's foot-dragging diplomacy, and the hypocritical aloofness of the “moderate” Arab leaders of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who clearly hoped privately for Hizbullah's defeat, seemed to substantiate charges of complicity in the killing.
当然，以色列常常作为受害者出现在令人信服的记事中，一直作为西方恶行的最好例子被一再举出。但以色列最近与真主党发生的战争更加火上浇油。战争可能是真主党引起的，但那对阿拉伯世界的电视观众而言根本不算什么。在保卫村庄的战斗中，真主党战士的顽强为抵抗增添了光彩。美国的外交拖拖拉拉，沙特和埃及“温和的”阿拉伯领导人表现出虚伪的超然姿态，他们心里却清楚得很，私下里都希望真主党被打败，这几方的作为使其屠杀共犯的指控看起来具体化了。
So entrenched now is the idea of an American-led assault on Muslims that virtually any new development is immediately enlisted as further evidence. The fact that terror attacks on Westerners, carried out in the name of Islam, may have raised some hackles goes without mention. So does the fact that countries such as Syria, under the cloak of resistance to the West, continue to promote agendas in Lebanon and elsewhere that have nothing to do with anti-Americanism, but with cementing their own regional influence.
如今，人们都认为美国领导着对穆斯林的袭击，这种想法深入人心，事实上，这种袭击的任何新进展都会立刻被列入更进一步的证据中。以伊斯兰名义发动的对西方人的恐怖袭击，这一事实可能已经引起了一些不必言及就引发的愤怒。诸如叙利亚这样的国家情势亦然，借口抵制西方，而继续在黎巴嫩及其他地方推动的日程与反美毫无关系，而是为了巩固其自身的地区影响力。
Even high-minded Western initiatives now arouse suspicion. The effort to deploy a tougher peacekeeping force in Darfur, where some 200,000 people have been killed and perhaps 1m displaced by a government-assisted slaughter of Darfuris, is widely seen as a subterfuge. The head of the Egyptian lawyers' union, a group which might be expected to defend the rights of the weak, recently declared that the true target of UN peacekeepers was Egypt: Sudan was simply “the next stop after Iraq on the road to the heart of Cairo”.
现在，甚至高尚的西方倡仪都会引起猜疑。达尔富尔地区已经有大约20万人被杀，由政府协助的、对达尔富尔人的屠杀可能已迫使100万人背井离乡，但在此部署一支更强硬的维和部队的努力被广泛视为一个诡计。埃及律师联合会是个期望能为弱势族群保护权利的团体，其负责人最近宣布，联合国维和人员的目标是埃及：苏丹仅仅是“在通向开罗心脏地带的路上，伊拉克之后的下一站”。
The manner of the ceasefire in Lebanon aroused scepticism, too. To many, the insertion of a UN peacekeeping force was aimed at recouping by diplomacy what Israel had lost by fighting. A recent poll found that 84% of Lebanese believe the war was “a premeditated attempt by the United States and Israel to impose a new regional order in the Middle East”. As for the international siege of the Palestinians until they renounce terrorism and accept the right of Israel to exist (see story), the popular perception is that the West, having claimed to support democracy, is now punishing Palestinians for having elected Hamas in a fair vote.
黎巴嫩战争的停战方式也引发怀疑。对于许多人而言，联合国维和部队的介入，其目标在于运用外交手段使以色列重获因为战争失去的东西。一份最近的民调发现，84％的黎巴嫩人认为，这场战争是“美国与以色列的一次有预谋的尝试，意在中东地区强加一个新秩序”。直到巴勒斯坦放弃恐怖主义并接受以色列存在的权利才会解除对其围困（另见别文），流行的观念认为，西方有言在先支持民主，但现在却因为在公平的选举中选出了哈马斯而惩罚巴勒斯坦人。
The shadow of Iran 伊朗的阴影
In the popular mind, attempts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions also mesh neatly with the narrative of Western powers holding back Muslims, or applying double standards. Why can't Iran have nukes if Israel can? Iranian diplomats ably exploit such doubts. So do a growing number of fellow-travellers in regional politics, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Islamist group whose ideological offshoots include Hamas and the main opposition movements in American-allied Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait and Yemen. “Any country should have the right to obtain nuclear technology or even nuclear arms for deterrence, especially if it is being threatened by another nuclear country,” says the Brotherhood's deputy leader, Muhammad Habib.
在一般人的想法中，限制伊朗雄心勃勃的核计划也是与西方国家压制穆斯林，或运用双重标准的说辞精巧配合的。如果以色列可以拥有核武器，为什么伊朗不可以？伊朗的外交官巧妙地利用了这样的疑问。地区政治中的政治同路人持这种想法的团体数量看涨，例如埃及的伊斯兰团体穆斯林兄弟会，其意识形态分支包括哈马斯和摩洛哥、约旦、科威特与也门这些美国盟友国内的主要反对运动组织。穆斯林兄弟会的副领导人哈比比说，“任何国家都有权拥有核技术或甚至用于威慑的核武器，尤其是如果这个国家被其他核国家威胁时。”
Such overt support from the most influential Sunni political grouping is telling. Clearly, Iran's vociferous backing of resistance movements has done wonders—outside Iraq—to heal the age-old rift between the two main branches of Islam. Elsewhere, the example of Hizbullah has—among ordinary citizens, at least—largely dispelled looming fears, first voiced by Jordan's King Abdullah, about the emergence of a “Shia crescent” from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf where Iranian mullahs might call upon millions of minority Arab Shias to rise up against Sunni Muslim dominance. Lebanon's Shia resistance has provided what one senior Western diplomat calls a new political paradigm: “an Arab party that actually means what it says and does what it promises.”
这种公然的支持来自最具影响力的逊尼派政治团体，颇有成效。很明显，伊朗对于抵抗运动的大声支持创造了奇迹——在伊拉克之外——愈合了伊斯兰两大主要分支间长久以来的嫌隙。在别的地方，例如真主党——至少在一般国民之中——已经消除了他们时隐时现的担忧，约旦国王阿卜杜拉首次说到的，关于“什叶派新月”联盟的出现，伊朗的毛拉们（译注：mullah是伊斯兰教徒间对高僧、学者的敬称）可能会号召自地中海至波斯湾这片地区千千万万的阿拉伯什叶派少数族群起来反对逊尼派穆斯林的统治地位。黎巴嫩的什叶派抵抗已经提供了，一位资深的西方外交官所谓的，一个新的政治范例，称其“一个事实上说话算数并兑现承诺的阿拉伯派别。”
Ayatollah Khamenei, brandishing a Kalashnikov and speaking in his fluent classical Arabic in a Friday sermon on October 13th, put the matter more bluntly. Blasting critics of Hizbullah as “cringing hirelings of the Great Satan”, he said that the Iranian-funded militia's victory had made the group so loved that Muslims everywhere felt they had participated in it. The claim is not far-fetched. In far-off Brunei, by the South China Sea, the sultan issued orders for the obligatory performance of special prayers for Israel's defeat. In Egypt, a solidly Sunni country ostensibly allied to America, the two most popular politicians, according to a recent survey, are the Hizbullah chief, Hassan Nasrallah, and President Ahmadinejad of Iran.
在10月13日的一次星期五布道上，哈梅内伊炫耀地挥舞着一把卡拉逊尼考夫枪，用他经典流利的阿拉伯语，把事情说得更直截了当了。他大肆抨击真主党的批评者是“恶魔撒旦卑躬屈膝的雇佣者”，他说，伊朗资助的军事胜利使真主党受到爱戴，所有地方的穆斯林都觉得他们共襄盛举。如此声称并非牵强附会。远在南中国海的汶莱（Brunei），苏丹发出命令，为以色列的失败举行特别的强制祈祷仪式。埃及是个由逊尼派稳固统治的国家，表面上是美国的盟友，根据一份最近的调查，在这里最受欢迎的两位政治人物是真主党首领纳斯鲁拉与伊朗总统艾哈迈迪内贾德。
Understandably, such evidence of a powerful mood-swing on the Arab “street” dismays and alarms pro-Western Arab leaders. It is not simply that the governments of countries such as Egypt and Jordan, which long ago settled their own problems with Israel, fear renewed public pressure to resume “resistance” (ie, war), which is what the Muslim Brotherhood promises if it comes to power. These American allies are hostile to Hizbullah because the group provides a dangerous example of a potent non-state actor armed and supported by neighbours. They abhor the Syrian regime, blaming it for meddling (and murdering) in Lebanon and for undermining efforts to persuade Hamas to recognise Israel. They are spooked by Hamas's electoral success and the possibility of Islamist encroachment much closer to home. The Muslim Brotherhood made impressive gains in Egypt's parliamentary elections last year, and is expected to do equally well in Jordanian polls scheduled for 2007. Morocco, another American ally, also faces elections next year, with analysts predicting a shoo-in for the Islamist opposition.
可理解的是，阿拉伯“路上”强劲的情绪推动力产生的这种迹象使亲西方的阿拉伯领导人觉得沮丧并对其敲响了警钟。不仅仅是诸如埃及与约旦这些很久以前与以色列一起解决他们自身问题的国家政府担心再兴的公众压力继续鼓吹“抵抗”（如，战争），这是穆斯林兄弟会承诺如果他们掌权要做的。这些美国的盟友对真主党心存敌意，因为这个团体提供了一个危险的例子，拥有强大的非国家武装并收到邻国的支持。他们憎恶叙利亚政权，指责其参与在黎巴嫩的干涉（与谋杀）并暗中破坏说服哈马斯承认以色列的努力。哈马斯的选举胜利以及伊斯兰极端分子侵蚀越发临近本土的可能性都吓住了他们。穆斯林兄弟会在去年埃及议会选举中的得利令人印象深刻，预计在2007年约旦排定的选举投票中，兄弟会的表现也会同样不错。美国的另一个盟友摩洛哥也面临明年的大选，分析家们预言伊斯兰反对派十有八九会获胜。
America's shaky friends 美国靠不住的朋友们
As for Iran, Egyptians have never forgiven its revolutionary leaders for naming a Tehran street after one of the assassins of their peacemaking president, Anwar Sadat. Lebanon's shaky governing coalition, now in a stand-off with Hizbullah, sees Iran as the main obstacle to a deal under which Hizbullah might focus on being a political party and give up its arms. Gulf states feel a more direct threat, since many of them host American military bases.
至于伊朗，埃及人永远也不会原谅伊朗的革命领袖将一条德黑兰的街道以一个暗杀缔造和平的埃及总统萨达特的凶手名字来命名。黎巴嫩不稳定的执政联盟，如今与真主党不分胜负，视伊朗为与真主党达成协定的主要障碍，按照此协定，真主党会集中注意力于成为一个政党并放弃其武装。由于许多海湾国家都有美国的军事基地存在，他们感受到了一股更直接的威胁。
The rulers of archly Sunni and conservative Saudi Arabia, in particular, have long viewed Iran as a dangerous rival. In the 1980s they blamed it for stirring unrest among the kingdom's large Shia minority, and in response helped bankroll Saddam Hussein's war against the Islamic Republic. During the recent Israel-Lebanon war, when some Saudi youths made the mistake of sticking posters of the admired Mr Nasrallah on their windscreens, Saudi police promptly arrested them.
尤其能伸能曲的逊尼派与保守的沙特阿拉伯统治者长期视伊朗为危险的对手。在1980年代，他们就指责伊朗在王国的大什叶派少数族群中激起骚动，作为回应，他们帮助萨达姆为其发动的对这个伊斯兰共和国的战争提供资金。在最近的以黎战争中，一旦一些沙特的年轻人犯错误将他们仰慕的纳斯鲁拉的海报帖到挡风玻璃上，沙特的警察就迅速将他们逮捕。
The Bush administration has belatedly tried to rally its allies and to bolster such beleaguered figures as the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and the prime ministers of Lebanon and Iraq. But the response has been half-hearted. This loose collection of accommodationist governments is finding it hard to gain traction against the resistance ideal. One problem they face is Israel, whose increasingly harsh operations against Palestinian fighters in the West Bank and Gaza have made it more toxic than ever. Israeli and Arab moderates both want to cool temperatures over Palestine and Lebanon and to contain Iran. But Arabs are uneasy at any hint of an alliance with the Jewish state.
布什政府试图重新团结它的盟友及帮助身陷围攻的人物，如巴勒斯坦总统阿巴斯及黎巴嫩和伊拉克的总理，但为时已晚。布什政府得到的回答半心半意。这一迁就主义者政府的松散集合发现要获得对付抵抗理想的吸引力着实困难。他们要面对的一个问题就是以色列，在西岸与加沙，以色列对付巴勒斯坦战士越发严厉的军事行动使以色列较以往中毒越深。以色列与阿拉伯的温和派都想给巴勒斯坦与黎巴嫩的局势降温并限制伊朗。但阿拉伯人对于与这个犹太国家形成联盟的任何一个暗示都感到不安。
America's own refusal to engage directly with the resistance block has polarised and complicated the situation. Discomfort with America grew particularly acute over the Lebanon war, when countries such as Saudi Arabia were forced, by public outrage at Israel's crushing response, to back away from their criticism of Hizbullah for having started the war.
美国自己拒绝了直接与抵抗集团交战，使局势两极分化且错综复杂了。贯穿黎巴嫩战争，对美国的不愉快尤其增长得尖锐，那时诸如沙特这样的国家，由于以色列斩钉截铁的回应引发了公众的义愤，他们被迫从对真主党挑起战争的批评回撤。
Yet, although it may lack the rejectionists' unity of purpose and their popular appeal, the accommodationist axis of American friends is not entirely toothless. Gulf countries now have plenty of oil cash with which to win goodwill by, for instance, rebuilding Lebanon and shoring up the Palestinian economy. Such largesse could prove persuasive, too, in trying to coax Syria away from its tight embrace of Iran, since Syria's economy relies on oil reserves that are fast running out.
然而，虽然由美国的朋友形成的迁就主义轴心可能缺乏拒绝派联合体的目标与广泛的吸引力，但他们并非全无招架之策。海湾国家现有充裕的石油现金，例如，可以借此重建黎巴嫩并支撑起巴勒斯坦的经济以赢得友好。由于叙利亚的经济仰赖其很快就要用尽的石油储备，如此慷慨地援助或许也能为试图好言相劝叙利亚脱离对伊朗紧密附庸的动因作出证实。
They might also make progress, with those on the Arab street who are still willing to listen, by posing the question of whether ordinary people really want to sacrifice lives and treasure in an endless fight against Israel. The answer of large numbers of Lebanese during the recent war was a resounding no. Raghida Dergham, a columnist for the Saudi-owned daily Al Hayat, writes sarcastically that if what she calls the axis of extremism is resolved on war, “we hope it is ready to liberate Palestine and not exploit the Palestinians as a tool for the ideology and hegemony of others.”
他们也可能取得进展，对那些常常上街依然愿意倾听的阿拉伯人提出这样的问题：一般人是否真的想在一场无休无止反对以色列的战斗中牺牲生命与财富？经历了最近这场战争的大多数黎巴嫩人给出的答案会是响亮的“不”。沙特国有日报《生活报》（Al Hayat）的专栏作家Raghida Dergham用讥讽的笔调写道，如果她所谓的极端主义轴心能用战争消解，“我们希望就要解放巴勒斯坦，而非利用巴勒斯坦人使之成为为别人的意识形态与霸权服务的工具。”
This comment pricks at both Iran and Syria. Few Muslims elsewhere are aware that Mr Khamenei, aside from being supreme leader of the revolution and running the powerful intelligence services, also styles himself Leader of the Islamic World. This suggests a much wider agenda than simple “resistance”. As for Syria, while it champions Islamist liberation movements abroad, mere membership of the Muslim Brotherhood inside the country remains a capital crime.
这一评论刺痛了伊朗与叙利亚双方。在别处，且不论哈梅内伊是革命的最高领袖且指挥着强大的情报机构，几乎没有什么穆斯林还觉得他以伊斯兰世界的领袖自居。这暗示着较之单纯的“抵抗”宽泛得多的行动日程。说到叙利亚，随着它追求的伊斯兰解放运动流行开来，在其国内，仅仅拥有穆斯林兄弟会的会员身份依然是一项死罪。
Arab moderates may be able to convince the Bush administration that the best way to ease tension would be for America itself to be more flexible. That would be wise, because the rejectionist front may not be as intractable as it appears. Syria's president has repeatedly signalled that he would shift his position if only some reward, such as a chance to recover the Golan Heights, were offered. Recent polling among Palestinians shows a similar openness to persuasion.
阿拉伯温和派也许能说服布什政府相信，缓和紧张形势的最佳方式可能是使美国自身变得更加有弹性。这可能是明智的，因为拒绝派阵线可能不如它显现出的如此难以瓦解。叙利亚总统一再发出信号，如果为其提供仅仅一些酬赏，例如重新获得戈兰高地的机会，他就会转变立场。最近在巴勒斯坦人中所做的民调显示出对于劝导相似的开放态度。
It is also clear that a powerful sector of Islamist opinion is so fundamentally rejectionist that it will never change. The best the West can do may be to ensure that it does not push more moderates into that camp. It could start by remembering that people choose to “resist” when they feel threatened.
也很清楚的是，伊斯兰极端分子所持的观点中强势的部分根本是拒绝主义的，永远不会改变。西方能做的最好的就是确保不会逼迫更多的温和派加入极端阵营。想想人们一旦觉得受到威胁，他们就会选择“抵抗”，从温和派到极端分子的转变就可能开始。
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“世上本无事，庸人自扰之。”这话的后半句用来形容美国的中东政策倒是很贴切。美国的民选总统小布什，上台之后不改其牛仔个性，到处横冲直撞。9.11之后，更是像一只进入中东的刺猬，虽然浑身都是刺，别人不敢惹，但是目标明显，难免吸引暗箭。
美国用莫须有的罪名除掉了视如芒刺的萨达姆政权。在此之前，在萨达姆的铁腕之下，伊拉克国内还算平静，虽然饱受制裁之苦，但老百姓不至于过着每天担心受到恐怖袭击的日子中。如果愿意的话，可以列举一大堆萨达姆的罪状，虽然如此，萨达姆政权对于伊拉克的稳定依然有所助益，不论其主观目的是否为了萨达姆的统治地位更加稳固。不论伊拉克人愿意或被强制接受萨达姆的统治，只要不是伊拉克人主动发动推翻其统治的革命或是起义，其他使其下台的方式总是遗患无穷的，而美国人的作为，则是下策之一。
美国想控制伊拉克当然不是一天两天的事了，当年就曾对其扶持有加，两国交恶之后，虽然美国失去了对其直接的影响力，但依然通过联合国的制裁对伊拉克指手画脚，也许是发现联合国的制裁依然不能使桀骜不驯的萨达姆就范，也为了能提供这个轮子上的国家源源不断的石油资源。于是，布什政府将其进军伊拉克包装成使伊拉克实现民主，这种外科手术式的运作显然忽略了伊拉克内部复杂的教派矛盾背景，美国人在事前也没有拟订什么周密的后续方案，战事比料想的更早更顺利地结束，这种出乎意料的快感使得美国人显得过分乐观。时至今日，布什的整个班子也越来越不乐观，虽然表面上还嘴硬，但是高层面对媒体采访时的表态则是愈发谨慎了。
德国前总理施罗德最近出了一本回忆录，披露了不少外交内幕。提到布什的时候，说他把他自己的宗教信仰过分掺杂进国家的政策。布什是个虔诚的基督徒，他年轻的时候酗酒、吸毒，皈依基督教之后，把这些毛病统统改掉了，他是个所谓的reborn Christian（重生的基督徒），因此对于自己的宗教信仰笃信不疑，更将其视为能够拯救他人的方法。因此，布什才会不经意间说出了要对恐怖主义发动“圣战”，如果了解布什，就不会奇怪他的这种不经意，也恰恰是这样的不经意，才能显露出其真正的思想所在。
阿拉伯人也许最看不惯的，是布什为代表的这种“文明的傲慢”，对伊斯兰文明的轻视与其时不时透出的敌意。“布什主义”的膨胀，带给世界的大概不是什么乐观的兆头。用枪炮为伊拉克人送来的民主是否能够在伊拉克生根则大有疑问。伊拉克位于中东的中心地带，美国人真会挑地方，不来则已，一来就在这里打了个楔子，也难怪被各种势力背景的恐怖主义分子当靶子了。
恐怖主义的根源当然有很多，但是这些年来，美国的政策无疑是诱发恐怖分子增长的重要原因。布什的以暴制暴，带给美国人更多的不安，虽然9.11之后，美国本土再也没有什么恐怖袭击的事件发生，但这不能带给美国人更多的安全感，仿佛美国人头上悬着一把达摩克利斯之剑，不知道什么突如其来的恐惧又会将大家带入一种无所适从的境地。
对于中东而言，尤其是伊拉克，民选政府软弱无力，恐怖袭击天天在街头上演，如何才能降低恐怖威胁？也许美国从伊拉克撤军能使针对美国人的非议减少，但是，是不是能够使恐怖袭击减少则另当别论。美国除掉萨达姆政权之后，带来了伊拉克国内政治势力的大洗牌，教派冲突因此加剧。美国在伊拉克控制力量的存在，也使得伊拉克的周边国家愈发显出不安，这种不安当然不乏内部极端势力的施压。否则，美国在中东的盟友也不会若即若离。
布什挑起的争端，除了源自其一贯坚持的美国的国家利益，也源自其个性。也许，布什会成为中东人眼里最烂的自由民主推销员。这还不要紧，如果将整个西方拉入其针对伊斯兰世界的种种作为，那么亨廷顿所谓的“文明的冲突”恐怕很难避免，哪壶不开提哪壶，布什的错误前不久也在教宗本笃十六世的身上重演，虽然教宗犯的是一个不大不小的错误，也表示了歉意，但伊斯兰世界依然不依不饶，他们将其视为基督教文明对伊斯兰文明的冒犯，如果每件小事都用放大镜来看，这个世界的未来恐怕不乐观，毕竟，文明的冲突带给人类的，注定是一场浩劫！
布什的任期也只剩下两年，如果年底的中期选举共和党落败，那布什就将成为“跛脚鸭”总统。如果这样，对布什以及共和党而言是挫折，但对世界而言，会不会是一个不大不小的转机？翻译 by 福建李菁
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