Germany's place in the world
关键词： Germany,德国,默克尔Germany's place in the world
Merkel as a world star
世界之林，德国之位——世界明星默克尔
Nov 16th 2006 | BERLIN / 2006年11月16日，柏林
From The Economist print edition / 来自《经济学人》中文版
Germany's chancellor wants to play a bigger role on the world stage. But are Germans ready?
德国总理想在世界舞台之上扮演更为重要的角色。但是，德国人准备就绪了吗？
WITH more than 80m people and the world's third-biggest economy, Germany squats like a giant in the centre of Europe. For most of the six decades since the second world war, it has been a giant in chains. The desire to tie it down was one of the chief motives of the German and French politicians who founded what has become the European Union. Memory has added fetters, too. The horrors of the Nazi period have imbued today's Germans with a profound antipathy to war and foreign entanglements.
德国有人口八千万，是世界第三大经济体，如巨人蛰伏，占据着欧洲的中心。第二次世界大战之后六十年间的大部分，德国巨人饱受枷锁之限。德法政治家建立欧盟前身的主要动机之一，便是约束德国。记忆亦增枷锁。今天的德国人，心头萦绕着对纳粹时期的恐惧，对战争以及与他国纠缠不清极度厌恶。
At the beginning of this decade, however, the giant stirred. Under the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder, Germany began cautiously to use military power outside its borders, in the Balkans. When America and Britain embarked on their Iraq adventure, Mr Schröder made a dramatic break with the United States, vigorously opposing the war and showing a new readiness to assert Germany's own power and interests. Now a new chancellor, Angela Merkel, has spent a year in office at the head of a grand coalition, the forced marriage of the centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU) and the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD). Next year she will occupy the rotating presidency of both the EU and the G8 rich-country club. Where will she take German foreign policy?
然而，这个十年之初，巨人又振奋了。施罗德任总理时，德国谨慎地开始在国外（巴尔干）用兵。美国与英国在伊拉克冒险时，施罗德出人意料，与美国分道扬镳了，大张旗鼓地反战，显示德国准备主张自身权利与利益的新姿态。如今的新总理默克尔就职的一年间，她被迫接受了由中右的基督教民主联盟（CDU，译注：简称“基民盟”）与中左的社会民主党（SPD，译注：简称“社民党”）组成大联合政府的方案。明年，她不但将成为欧盟的轮值主席，也将成为八国峰会（G8）的东道主。她将使德国的外交政策走向何方？
When she took over the chancellery last November, many observers expected her to be a German version of Margaret Thatcher (minus the threatening handbag), and knock the economy back into shape. Instead, she has turned out to be more of a foreign-policy chancellor. To avoid political quicksands, she let visits abroad dominate her first few months. She was more effective in helping to bring about a ceasefire in Lebanon than in putting an end to annoyingly narrow-minded fights about health care and other domestic matters. And next year, she is expected to star, not just because she will lead the EU and the G8, but because so many of the other world leaders are lame ducks while she is just starting out.
当她在去年11月接任总理，许多观察家预计，她会是个德国版的撒切尔夫人（但不带吓人的手提包），并将着手重振经济。实际上，她却是个更为重视外交政策的总理。为了避免出现政治危机，她在上任的头几个月就安排了外访。国内有关健保与其他事务的争论不断，思想僵化，令人厌烦，比起终止此类争论，她更擅长于帮助黎以促成一次停火。明年，预计她要成为明星，不只因为她将主持欧盟与八国峰会，还因为其他的国家领导人都是“跛脚鸭”了，而她正开始有所作为。
In ten years from now, says one of her close advisers, the grand coalition may be remembered not for the disappointments on the home front but for the fact that it has helped to reconcile Germans to the truth that unification and the end of the cold war did not create a peaceful world, but a brutal one full of conflicts, “and that Germany must assume responsibility to solve them.” But if Germans can no longer shield themselves from the harsh realities of world affairs, how they react to this “reality shock” remains an open question.
她的一位重要顾问说，从现在开始的十年之后，人民想起大联合政府，可能不是由于对其内政方面的失望，而是由于使德国人无奈地接受了这样的事实：统一与冷战结束并没有带来世界和平，代之以一个野蛮而充满冲突的世界，“而德国必须承担责任，解决这些问题。”但是，如果德国再也无法回避国际事务的严酷现实，对此“现实的冲击”会如何反应依然是个未决问题。
The change, of course, was not sudden. Germany began assuming a stronger world role once the end of the cold war brought the country not just unification, but full sovereignty. Its foreign policy, much like its welfare state, was obliged to face up to the consequences of globalisation. But whereas the welfare state could not be easily adapted to fit with the way the world was going, Germany's foreign policy turned out to be far more in tune with the new challenges of an interdependent world. The catastrophe of the second world war, and decades of living with limited sovereignty, taught the Germans the virtues of soft power and multilateralism. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a long-time former foreign minister, once famously said that Germany had no national interests, because its interests were identical with Europe's interests.
当然，改变并非突如其来。冷战结束带给德国的不仅是统一，还有完整的主权。那时，德国就开始以更强大的世界一员出现了。德国的外交政策，正如其福利国家的定位，都是面对全球化的后果而因应制定的。但作为福利国家却不太容易与世界的大势相契相容，而德国的外交政策原来远更适应互相依存的世界所面临的新挑战。第二次世界大战的灾难，加之国家在几十年间被限制主权，教会了德国人崇尚软权力与多元主义的价值。长期任职的前外交部长根舍（Hans-Dietrich Genscher）曾有名言：德国无国家之利益，因其利益与欧洲之利益恒等。
But where Germany long differed from its allies was in the ability and the willingness to send troops abroad. The Bundeswehr, the German armed forces, was set up to defend the homeland against attacks from the east. It would not have been politically possible, until the 1990s, to deploy soldiers in foreign interventions: most Germans were staunchly pacifist. Only in 1994 did the constitutional court rule that German soldiers could be allowed outside the NATO area, and then only if parliament had given its approval.
但长期以来，德国区别于盟友之处在于其对外派兵的能力与意愿。德国武装部队，即Bundeswehr（联邦国防军），其建军是为了国土免遭来自东面的打击。由于大多数德国人有着坚定的和平主义信仰，直到1990年代，政治上才有了在国外调解纷争时部署德国军队的可能。就在1994年，宪法法院裁定，只有在议会批准之后，德军可以在北约地区之外行动。
It took a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, both with strong pacifist leanings, to send the Bundeswehr into armed combat, thus breaking the post-war taboo. In 1999, Mr Schröder risked a vote of confidence to dispatch fighter planes to take part in NATO's war in Kosovo. Nowadays, Germany is one of the larger providers of peacekeeping troops, with nearly 9,000 men and women spread over a dozen missions that range from Afghanistan to Sudan (see chart).
这样，虽然打破了战后的禁忌，有着强烈和平主义倾向的社会民主党和绿党联合政府还是可以派德军加入武装冲突。1999年，施罗德冒着信任投票的风险火速派出战斗机参加了北约的科索沃战争。如今，德国是维和部队的较大派出国之一，有近9000名男女军人分布在世界各地，自阿富汗延伸至苏丹，正执行十多项任务（见图表）。
Mr Schröder reconciled Germans to the use of military power but without compromising the country's belief in non-military intervention. Armed forces are still seen as one instrument only in dealing with a conflict. In northern Afghanistan, for instance, Germany is testing out a new type of provincial reconstruction team (PRT), which truly mixes military and civil groups. The German PRTs are led jointly by a military commander and a diplomat, and the soldiers are complemented by teams of civil servants and aid workers.
施罗德使德国人认可了在运用军事力量时，不必放弃其非军事干涉的国家信仰。动用武装部队依然被视为仅在处理争端时使用手段。例如，在阿富汗北部，德国试验出了一支新型的地方重建队（PRT），真正混合了军事与平民组织。德国的地方重建队由一名军事指挥官与一名外交官共同领导，文职人员与援助工人队伍为士兵提供补充。
A new sort of German nationalism 新型德国国家主义
Mr Schröder also introduced another novelty into Germany's post-war foreign policy: a kind of German Gaullism. Foreign policy, he insisted, “is decided in Berlin”, and he vowed to defend Germany's interests. This partly explains his opposition to the war in Iraq, an opposition which helped him to get re-elected in 2002, but badly damaged transatlantic relations. His more nationalist approach led to close friendships with the French and Russian presidents, and also to the pursuit of a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.
施罗德也为德国战后的外交政策加入了另外的新创意，即一种“德国戴高乐主义”。他坚称，外交政策“决定于柏林”，他还发誓捍卫德国利益。这部分解释了他反对伊拉克战争的原因，这一反对使他在2002年再度当选，但严重破坏了欧美关系。更为国家主义的态度使他与法俄两国的总统有了亲密的友情，也使他追求德国的安理会常任理事国席位。
As a result, Germany was no longer perceived as a fixed star in the European firmament, let alone stolidly in mid-Atlantic. It was seen to be much freer, prepared to act on its own. Ms Merkel's contribution was to move swiftly to return the perception to what it had been. She has realigned Germany's position, putting some distance between herself and Jacques Chirac, and between herself and Russia's leader, Vladimir Putin, while edging closer to America's president, George Bush.
结果，德国不再被视为欧洲苍穹里的恒星了，更不用说在中大西洋地区徘徊不前。大家也都觉得德国更自由了，准备依自己的意志行事。默克尔为德国迅速恢复其曾有过的地位作出了贡献。她重新调整了德国的位置，不但与希拉克之间，也与俄罗斯领导人普京之间留了点距离，同时向美国总统布什的方向移得更近了。
This effort to reposition Germany has guided her foreign policy. Mr Chirac's frequent hand-kissing notwithstanding, relations with France have cooled significantly. And when Mr Putin visited Germany in October, Ms Merkel did not hesitate to address the murder of a Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya. This was in sharp contrast to Mr Schröder who, during his tenure, called Russia's president “a democrat through and through”.
重新定位德国的努力指导她制定外交政策。尽管希拉克对她频频吻手示好，德法两国的关系仍然显著冷却。普京在10月访问德国，默克尔毫不踌躇，向他提出了记者安娜•波利特科夫斯卡娅（Anna Politkovskaya）的谋杀案。这与施罗德形成了强烈的对比，在施罗德主政期间，他称俄罗斯总统是“完完全全的民主主义者”。
At the same time, she has established an excellent relationship with Mr Bush, though she does not flinch from criticising the United States on such issues as Guantánamo and the CIA “rendition” flights. During her time in the EU presidency, her government would like to start a new transatlantic project. This would be a joint American-EU effort to come up with common standards in such areas as hedge-fund regulation and intellectual property.
与此同时，虽然她并未退缩对美国提出了批评，如关塔那摩（Guantánamo）与中情局的“引渡”航班等问题，但她与布什建立了极好的关系。在她任欧盟轮值主席期间，其政府有可能展开一项新的跨大西洋规划。可能是欧美共同努力，在诸如立法管制套头基金与保护智慧财产权等领域提出共同标准。（译注：hedge-fund“套头基金”，也称“套利基金”，指为弥补某些所持证券贬值的可能性，而持有其他可能升值的证券，以降低风险的一种投资基金。）
An even more important difference between Ms Merkel and her predecessor is her position on EU enlargement, particularly the question of Turkish membership. Mr Schröder was a staunch proponent of Turkish accession, mainly for geopolitical reasons, seeing Turkey as a link between Europe and the Muslim world. Although Ms Merkel wants negotiations to go ahead, she thinks Turkey's relations with the EU should stop short of full membership—a position that is now supported by a large majority of Germans. This could spell trouble within the coalition, since the SPD still wants Turkey inside the union.
默克尔与其前任更为重要的一个不同之处在于她对欧盟扩大的立场，尤其是是否同意土耳其入盟。施罗德坚决同意土耳其加入，主要是处于地缘政治的考量，视其为欧洲与穆斯林世界之间的联系。然而，默克尔想让谈判取得进展，她认为，土耳其与欧盟的关系止于土耳其取得其完全的成员地位——这一立场如今得到绝大多数德国人的支持。由于社民党依然希望土耳其入盟，这将招致联合政府内部的困境。
The quest to become a permanent member of the Security Council has been quietly abandoned, for now. Instead, Germany is playing an important part in foreign issues where it believes it can make a difference. Witness the negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme, in which Germany's involvement, together with the five permanent council members, is signalled by the shorthand “P5 plus one”.
德国不声不响，暂时放弃了寻求成为安理会的常任理事国。代之以在其相信能有不同作为的国际议题上扮演重要角色。例如被简称为“五加一”的机制，即德国与安理会五常共同参与了旨在处理伊朗核问题的谈判。
Germany, says Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, is now pretty much where it belongs: squarely at the centre. Whether it wants to be or not, the country is a Mittelmacht, or middle power. It is not a superpower, able to throw its weight about, but it is in a good position to take responsibility in cases where it can bring something to the table. This is so, for instance, in Central Asia, where Germany is not just the only European country with embassies in all five countries, but has also developed good links with civil society across the region.
德国国际与安全事务研究所（the German Institute for International and Security Affairs）所长Volker Perthes说，德国现在位置恰到好处：正好位于中心。不论其是否希望，德国是中等大国，德语作Mittelmacht。超级大国可以到处发挥其影响力，但德国不行，不过其所处的地位使德国能将一些事情搬上谈判桌，并承担起相应的责任。正是如此，例如，在中亚，德国不仅是在那儿的五国都派驻大使的欧洲国家，也与该地区各国的公民社会发展良好关系。
It is hardly surprising, then, that Germans, so full of domestic gloom, are relatively happy about their current place in the world. But they are warned by Michael Zürn, dean of the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, that this is no reason for self-congratulation. In a recent paper, he tries to assess whether Germany is doing enough to live up to its self-image of being “a power of peace”. His sobering conclusion is not exactly, at least compared with other countries.
此外，几乎不令人惊讶的是，对于内政如此忧虑的德国人都对他们最近在世界上的地位感到相对愉快。但是柏林Hertie管理学院的主任Michael Zürn警告他们说，自我祝贺毫无道理。在最近的一份报纸上，他试图评价，为了配得上其自我定位的“和平力量”形象，德国的作为是否足够。他冷静地得出结论，至少同其他国家比起来，德国做得未必够。
Hesitant power for peace 犹豫不决的和平力量
A direct comparison of Germany's defence spending (1.4% of GDP) with that of the United States (3.7%) is somewhat unfair: the whole point of Germany's foreign policy has been to avoid putting resources mainly in the military basket. But even if you add together the budgets of the ministries of defence, development and foreign affairs, Germany's record is not stellar. This share of “international policy” in Germany's federal budget has dropped from more than 20% in the early 1990s to 12% last year—not just because of less money for defence but also because there is less for development aid. Other indicators confirm that Germany is only a Mittelmacht when it comes to committing resources to development aid.
直接比较德国与美国的国防支出（前者占国民生产总值的1.4％，后者为3.7％），有点儿不公平，因为德国外交政策的总目标避免将军事花销作为资源分配的重点。但是，如果将国防、开发与外事部门的预算累计，德国的记录并不耀眼。德国联邦预算中“国际政策”所占的份额从1990年代之初的超过20％降至去年的12％，不但是由于国防开支减少了，还因为开发援助也更少了。其他的指示者坚持认为，说到将资源投入开发援助，德国仅仅是个Mittelmacht（中等大国）。
They could do with better backing 有了更好的后援，他们会做得不错
Moreover, the number of German troops abroad do not tell the full story. The Bundeswehr has been slow to adapt to a world in which conventional war in defence of the homeland is unlikely. Despite 253,000 soldiers and a budget of euro24 billion ($28 billion), it has a lot of trouble mustering and equipping its peacekeepers. And these troops have rarely been at the centre of the action: in Afghanistan, they stay in the relatively calm north; in Lebanon, they patrol at sea, not on land.
再者，外派德军的数目也不能完整说明情况。Bundeswehr（德国武装部队）适应世界的脚步缓慢，在这个世界，不太可能再用常规战争保家卫国了。尽管有253000名士兵与每年240亿欧元（280亿美元）的预算，征召与装备维和人员的困难仍为数众多。这些维和部队鲜见于军事行动的中心地带：在阿富汗，他们留驻于相对平静的北方；在黎巴嫩，他们则在海上巡逻，不着陆地。
More important in the long run, argues Mr Zürn, is the degree to which foreign-policy questions play a role in Germany's public debates. Though the coverage of international affairs in leading newspapers and broadcasts has increased, particularly when it comes to matters to do with the EU, domestic issues continue to dominate, even more than they do in other European countries. Politicians seem less and less interested in foreign-policy matters that pay no dividends on election day. Of the 109 new members who entered the Bundestag, Germany's parliament, at last year's election, only one admitted to an interest in foreign policy. Nor does it help that Germany is rather short on foreign-policy experts. “Foreign policy has no lobby of its own,” says Mr Perthes.
Zürn认为，长远而言，更为重要的是，对于外交政策问题的公共辩论在德国扮演角色的程度。虽然各大主流报纸与广播媒体对于国际事务的报道增加了，但是，尤其论及欧盟事务时，内政议题继续占据主导地位，更甚于对其他欧洲国家的关注。政客们似乎对于外交政策事务越来越兴趣索然，在选举日，更是置之不理。在德国议会Bundestag的109位新议员中，只有一位承认对外交政策有兴趣。这也无助于德国颇缺乏外交政策专家的现实。皮尔塞斯（Mr Perthes）说，“外交政策没有自己的说客。”
Even though the public seems fairly content, at least for the moment, with the way that foreign policy is going, the country's leaders have not yet done enough to ensure that support will continue for the policy of sending troops abroad. In urging the dispatch of troops to Kosovo, Mr Schröder used strong moral imperatives (“Never again Auschwitz”) to convince the public to allow fighter planes to go into combat. It is hard to follow so emotional an approach with less passionate justifications. There has seldom been any open talk about military dangers. And only low-risk missions are proposed.
至少此时此刻，面对如此的外交政策运作，纵然公众似乎相当满意，在保证国民继续支持对外派兵的政策上，国家领导人仍做得不够。在促使对科索沃派兵时，施罗德使用了强烈的道德强制（“永远别让奥斯维辛的悲剧重演”），以说服公众同意战斗机飞赴战场。如此情绪化的做法而有着更少激昂的辩护，真令人难以置信。德国领导人对军事危险公开发表谈话极为罕见。如果有，仅见于提议参与低风险的任务。
There are obvious reasons for this. Pacifism remains deeply rooted. Moreover, parliament's powers in military matters is a German speciality: even a mission composed of two envoys in Ethiopia must be approved and its mandate renewed annually. But what this means is that, although the public now accepts the need for intervention and peacekeeping, the support is not all that solid. Most people see soldiers as little more than armed development-aid workers, who expend goodwill and good works, but do not get harmed. There may well be a backlash, says Josef Janning of the Bertelsmann Foundation, a think-tank, if something really bad happens, such as a busload of soldiers dying while fighting the Taliban.
出现这种情况的原因很明显。和平主义在德国人的心中依然根深蒂固。再者，议会对军事事务的权力有着德国特质：即使一项在埃塞俄比亚的任务只包括两位特使也要议会批准，并且议会负责每年重新授权。而这意味着，虽然公众现在接受干涉与维和的需求，但其支持不会一直那么稳固。多数人视士兵与武装的开发援助工人无异，他们付出了善意且工作出色，但不会受到伤害。智库贝塔斯曼基金会（the Bertelsmann Foundation）的Josef Janning说，如果真有什么不测，例如在与塔利班的战斗中有一整车的士兵伤亡，很可能会产生（政治上的）强烈反响。
Fortunately, the Bundeswehr has been lucky so far. Since 1991, 64 German soldiers have been killed, most of them by accident. But this state of affairs may not continue. In Afghanistan, for instance, the north is no longer an oasis of calm and German soldiers are regularly attacked. Germans are also discovering that their soldiers can come home as traumatised war veterans, and sometimes do nasty things in action. Witness the uproar created by pictures of German soldiers in Afghanistan holding up skulls. More to the point, NATO allies are turning up the heat on Germany to let its soldiers fight in Afghanistan's much more dangerous south.
幸运的是，德国国防军（Bundeswehr）到目前为止运气都不错。自1991年至今，有64名德国士兵殉职，其中大多数死于意外。但这种参与事务的状态恐难为继。例如，在阿富汗，北方不再是局势平静的绿洲，德国驻军时不时就遭到攻击。德国人也发现，他们的士兵回国的身份成了受创伤的战争退役军人，他们在行动中有时也有龌龊勾当。德国士兵在阿富汗手举骷髅头，并拍照存证，由此引发的丑闻喧嚣一时。对于更多要执行的任务，北约盟国也在为德国加温，让德军承担阿富汗南部更危险得多的战事。
The battlefield is not the only place where the rules of engagement are changing. For Germany, the negotiations with Iran were supposed to be an example of effective multilateralism. But now, with Iran unresponsive, Germany may one day soon have to decide whether it is willing to accept the price of tougher sanctions.
战场不是契约规则不断变化的唯一地点，对于德国而言，与伊朗的谈判该是多边主义行之有效的示例。但现在，伊朗回应冷淡，可能很快会有一天，德国不得不决定是否愿意接受对伊朗更严厉制裁的代价。
And this summer, Germany found that it, too, is not entirely safe from Islamist terrorism, despite its opposition to the war in Iraq. Two Lebanese students placed bombs on regional trains, though these fortunately failed to explode.
今年夏天，尽管反对伊拉克战争，德国也发现自己无法完全免受伊斯兰原教旨恐怖主义者的威胁。两个黎巴嫩学生在地区的火车班车上安放了，然而幸运的是，这些都没爆炸。
For decades, Germany was happy fighting culture wars over nuclear versus renewable energy, while conveniently forgetting that it was increasingly dependent on Russian gas imports. But a recently leaked memo by the foreign ministry's internal think-tank has triggered a heated debate that is reminiscent of discussions about the Soviet Union during the cold war—and also exposes frictions between the foreign ministry and the chancellery. The leaked paper argues that the EU should strengthen its economic and cultural links with Russia, an approach it calls “growing closer by interweaving” (which explains why some have dubbed it a “new Ostpolitik”, given that this was based on the mantra “change through becoming closer”). To critics, this amounts to ignoring both the issue of human rights in Russia, and the danger, for Germany, of energy dependence.
几十年以来，德国在核能与可再生能源之上的文化战打得不亦乐乎，同时，忘了对俄罗斯进口天然气的依赖不断增加。但是，最近外交部的内部智囊团泄漏了一份备忘录，引发了激烈辩论，让人联想起冷战时代对于苏联的讨论，也暴露了外交部与总理之间的抵牾。泄漏出的文件内容认为，欧盟必须加强与俄罗斯之间的经济与文化联系，文件称此做法为“通过紧密结合变得更紧密”（这解释了为什么一些人将其称作“新东方政策”（new Ostpolitik）[译注：Ostpolitik“东方政策”，是曾任联邦德国外长和总理的勃兰特制定和实施的，旨在打开东西方的冷战僵局]，给定的政策基础为“通过变得更紧密而改变”这样的“咒文”）。对于批评者而言，这相当于忽略了两项议题，即俄罗斯的人权以及，对德国而言，能源依赖将带来的危险。
But, at least in the short run, the EU remains the most pressing issue for Germany. Although the government is trying to lower expectations, hopes still run high that Germany can salvage the proposed EU constitution. Yet the presidential election in France next May means that there is not much time, during Germany's six-month presidency, to tackle the issue.
但是，至少就短期而言，对于德国最迫切的议题是欧盟。尽管政府在试图降低预期，但对德国挽救欧盟宪法提案仍然寄予厚望。而法国明年5月就要举行总统选举，这意味着剩下的时间不多了，德国要在历时六个月的轮值主席任内处理此项议题。
In a sense, this presidency will really begin only on March 25th, when leaders of the EU's member states gather in Berlin for the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the union's founding document, and adopt a “Berlin Declaration”. This is supposed to be only a few pages long and drafted in direct talks between governments rather than by the Brussels bureaucracy. The hope is that it will re-launch the union, by stating common values and committing members to a genuine effort on the EU constitution.
在某种意义上，轮值主席的任期从3月25日才真正开始，届时，欧盟成员国的领导人将聚首柏林，纪念欧盟的奠基文件《罗马条约》（the Treaty of Rome）签定50周年，还要通过一份“柏林宣言”（Berlin Declaration）。这份宣言预计只有几页，在政府间举行直接会谈时就可草拟，而不用经过布鲁塞尔的欧盟机构。通过申明共同价值及成员国作出保证，通过真诚的努力制定欧盟宪法，柏林宣言将有望使欧盟重新发动起来。
Germany will need to be more creative than that if it is to accomplish what Ms Merkel calls “squaring the circle”: tweaking the constitutional treaty to make it more acceptable to critics, notably in France, but without obliging the 15 member states that have already ratified it to do so again. Ms Merkel will consult to find out what members can accept, and when decisions would fit into their political schedule. At the EU summit next June, Germany will present a report that outlines how the constitution might be salvaged until France takes over the presidency in 2008.
较之达成默克尔所谓的“处理要务”，德国必须变得更有创意：设法让宪法性条约更能被批评者接受，特别是在法国的那些批评者，但不必责成已经批准条约的15个成员国再批准一次。默克尔将协商确定哪些成员国能够接受，以及决定何时能顺应其国内政治进程。在明年6月的欧盟峰会上，德国将提出一份报告，就2008年法国总统交接前如何挽救欧盟宪法作出概述。
If there is a European leader to find a solution, Ms Merkel may be the one. Among her colleagues, says Gerd Langguth of Bonn University, who has written her biography, she stands out as being extremely rational, wanting to get things done and not making a big fuss about herself. At home, this has become somewhat of a weakness, argues Mr Langguth: she tends to underestimate the importance of emotion in politics and the need to demonstrate leadership. On the international scene, however, it may be a strength: international issues are mostly about interests and law—and not about calming erratic state premiers from Bavaria or North Rhine-Westphalia.
如果有一位欧洲领导人能找到解困之道，恐怕非默克尔莫数了。默克尔传记的作者，波恩大学的Gerd Langguth说，默克尔与她的同事相比，她极为理性，因此显得突出，处理好事情而不会过分自夸。Langguth认为，在国内，这多少成了一个弱点，她倾向于低估政治中情绪的重要性，也对表明领导地位的需要估计不足。然而，换了国际场面，这就成了强项：国际议题大多与利益和法律相关，而非安抚来自巴伐利亚州（Bavaria）或北莱茵-威斯特法伦州（North Rhine-Westphalia）性情乖张的州长。
A successful EU presidency would give her the authority she needs to breathe life into the grand coalition, says Wolfgang Nowak, of the Alfred Herrhausen Society, a think-tank. This would be welcome, for things are not so good at home. Yet, in more than one way, Germany's political system is simply doing what it was built to do after 1945: protect democracy by making it hard to bring about fundamental change. In no other rich country do so many players have a say in how their nation is governed: the state premiers, the coalitions, the constitutional court. Many had hoped that this latest coalition would somehow manage to overcome the “joint-decision-making trap”, bringing the country up to speed with the rest of the world.
智库阿尔弗雷德-何豪森学会（the Alfred Herrhausen Society）的Wolfgang Nowak说，一位成功的欧盟轮值主席会带给她所需的权威，使大联合政府获得生气。能这样大家会拍手称快，毕竟国内的情况没那么好。此外，从各种角度而言，德国的政治体制只是照着1945年之后的建制运作：政治基础难以改变，以此保障民主制度。再没有一个富裕国家有如此之多的政治参与者对他们的国家如何治理有发言权：各州州长、联合政府，及宪法法院。许多人希望，最新的这届联合政府能某种程度成功克服“共同政策制定的怪圈”，带领国家迅速赶上世界先进。
In the coalition's first year, it was probably a good thing that it did not. Not trying too hard to cut the budget deficit encouraged the economy to recover nicely. Growth is likely to reach 2.4%, the highest rate in five years. Unemployment is down by nearly 500,000 on a year ago, to some 4.3m people. And, thanks to booming tax revenues, even the budget deficit is likely to fall to its lowest level since the country's unification 16 years ago.
联合政府上台的第一年，可能什么也不做是件好事。别太急着削减预算赤字以刺激经济复苏，使之表现靓丽。成长率很可能达到2.4％，五年来的最高值。失业人口较之一年前减少近50万，降至430万人。再者，由于税收猛增，就连预算赤字也很可能降至统一16年以来的最低水平。
A tough learning process 艰苦的学习过程
The real problem is that Germans are continuing to lose faith in their political system—mainly as a result of the bickering within the coalition. Both the CDU and the SPD are hovering around 30% in the polls. Worse, according to a recent survey, a majority of Germans now say, for the first time, that they are no longer satisfied with how their democracy works.
真正的问题在于，德国人对他们的政治体制继续丧失信心，主要是联合政府内部争吵不断导致的结果。基民盟与社民党的支持率都徘徊在30％。根据一份最近的调查，更糟糕的是，绝大多数德国人现在认为，他们有史以来第一次对他们民主体制的运作不再满意。
Such a snapshot should not be misread: Germans are not about to ditch democracy. But there is a danger that, unhappy about direction, they may rediscover isolationism. Already, Euroscepticism is on the rise. And two-thirds of Germans now think that their soldiers should not be sent on any new missions. “Germans are still learning that they have to take over more responsibility,” says a top official at the chancellery. “The problem could become that the world will ask us to do too much at this stage of our learning process.” Germany has made great progress at finding its place in the world since unification, but it is not yet over the hump of history.
不能将如此一瞥误读：德国人并非要抛弃民主制度。但他们对制度的方向不满，有重新复活孤立主义的危险。“欧洲怀疑主义”（Euroscepticism）思潮业已在涨。现在，有2/3的德国人认为，不该再派他们的士兵参与任何任务了。总理府的一位高级官员说，“德国人仍在学习，他们必须承担更多责任。在我们学习过程中的这一阶段，要是世界要求我们做得太多，那么这就可能形成问题。”自东西德统一，德国就在世界舞台上寻找其合适的位置，如今已经取得了巨大进步，但德国还并未跨越历史的驼峰。翻译 by 福建李菁
Merkel as a world star
世界之林，德国之位——世界明星默克尔
Nov 16th 2006 | BERLIN / 2006年11月16日，柏林
From The Economist print edition / 来自《经济学人》中文版
Germany's chancellor wants to play a bigger role on the world stage. But are Germans ready?
德国总理想在世界舞台之上扮演更为重要的角色。但是，德国人准备就绪了吗？
WITH more than 80m people and the world's third-biggest economy, Germany squats like a giant in the centre of Europe. For most of the six decades since the second world war, it has been a giant in chains. The desire to tie it down was one of the chief motives of the German and French politicians who founded what has become the European Union. Memory has added fetters, too. The horrors of the Nazi period have imbued today's Germans with a profound antipathy to war and foreign entanglements.
德国有人口八千万，是世界第三大经济体，如巨人蛰伏，占据着欧洲的中心。第二次世界大战之后六十年间的大部分，德国巨人饱受枷锁之限。德法政治家建立欧盟前身的主要动机之一，便是约束德国。记忆亦增枷锁。今天的德国人，心头萦绕着对纳粹时期的恐惧，对战争以及与他国纠缠不清极度厌恶。
At the beginning of this decade, however, the giant stirred. Under the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder, Germany began cautiously to use military power outside its borders, in the Balkans. When America and Britain embarked on their Iraq adventure, Mr Schröder made a dramatic break with the United States, vigorously opposing the war and showing a new readiness to assert Germany's own power and interests. Now a new chancellor, Angela Merkel, has spent a year in office at the head of a grand coalition, the forced marriage of the centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU) and the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD). Next year she will occupy the rotating presidency of both the EU and the G8 rich-country club. Where will she take German foreign policy?
然而，这个十年之初，巨人又振奋了。施罗德任总理时，德国谨慎地开始在国外（巴尔干）用兵。美国与英国在伊拉克冒险时，施罗德出人意料，与美国分道扬镳了，大张旗鼓地反战，显示德国准备主张自身权利与利益的新姿态。如今的新总理默克尔就职的一年间，她被迫接受了由中右的基督教民主联盟（CDU，译注：简称“基民盟”）与中左的社会民主党（SPD，译注：简称“社民党”）组成大联合政府的方案。明年，她不但将成为欧盟的轮值主席，也将成为八国峰会（G8）的东道主。她将使德国的外交政策走向何方？
When she took over the chancellery last November, many observers expected her to be a German version of Margaret Thatcher (minus the threatening handbag), and knock the economy back into shape. Instead, she has turned out to be more of a foreign-policy chancellor. To avoid political quicksands, she let visits abroad dominate her first few months. She was more effective in helping to bring about a ceasefire in Lebanon than in putting an end to annoyingly narrow-minded fights about health care and other domestic matters. And next year, she is expected to star, not just because she will lead the EU and the G8, but because so many of the other world leaders are lame ducks while she is just starting out.
当她在去年11月接任总理，许多观察家预计，她会是个德国版的撒切尔夫人（但不带吓人的手提包），并将着手重振经济。实际上，她却是个更为重视外交政策的总理。为了避免出现政治危机，她在上任的头几个月就安排了外访。国内有关健保与其他事务的争论不断，思想僵化，令人厌烦，比起终止此类争论，她更擅长于帮助黎以促成一次停火。明年，预计她要成为明星，不只因为她将主持欧盟与八国峰会，还因为其他的国家领导人都是“跛脚鸭”了，而她正开始有所作为。
In ten years from now, says one of her close advisers, the grand coalition may be remembered not for the disappointments on the home front but for the fact that it has helped to reconcile Germans to the truth that unification and the end of the cold war did not create a peaceful world, but a brutal one full of conflicts, “and that Germany must assume responsibility to solve them.” But if Germans can no longer shield themselves from the harsh realities of world affairs, how they react to this “reality shock” remains an open question.
她的一位重要顾问说，从现在开始的十年之后，人民想起大联合政府，可能不是由于对其内政方面的失望，而是由于使德国人无奈地接受了这样的事实：统一与冷战结束并没有带来世界和平，代之以一个野蛮而充满冲突的世界，“而德国必须承担责任，解决这些问题。”但是，如果德国再也无法回避国际事务的严酷现实，对此“现实的冲击”会如何反应依然是个未决问题。
The change, of course, was not sudden. Germany began assuming a stronger world role once the end of the cold war brought the country not just unification, but full sovereignty. Its foreign policy, much like its welfare state, was obliged to face up to the consequences of globalisation. But whereas the welfare state could not be easily adapted to fit with the way the world was going, Germany's foreign policy turned out to be far more in tune with the new challenges of an interdependent world. The catastrophe of the second world war, and decades of living with limited sovereignty, taught the Germans the virtues of soft power and multilateralism. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a long-time former foreign minister, once famously said that Germany had no national interests, because its interests were identical with Europe's interests.
当然，改变并非突如其来。冷战结束带给德国的不仅是统一，还有完整的主权。那时，德国就开始以更强大的世界一员出现了。德国的外交政策，正如其福利国家的定位，都是面对全球化的后果而因应制定的。但作为福利国家却不太容易与世界的大势相契相容，而德国的外交政策原来远更适应互相依存的世界所面临的新挑战。第二次世界大战的灾难，加之国家在几十年间被限制主权，教会了德国人崇尚软权力与多元主义的价值。长期任职的前外交部长根舍（Hans-Dietrich Genscher）曾有名言：德国无国家之利益，因其利益与欧洲之利益恒等。
But where Germany long differed from its allies was in the ability and the willingness to send troops abroad. The Bundeswehr, the German armed forces, was set up to defend the homeland against attacks from the east. It would not have been politically possible, until the 1990s, to deploy soldiers in foreign interventions: most Germans were staunchly pacifist. Only in 1994 did the constitutional court rule that German soldiers could be allowed outside the NATO area, and then only if parliament had given its approval.
但长期以来，德国区别于盟友之处在于其对外派兵的能力与意愿。德国武装部队，即Bundeswehr（联邦国防军），其建军是为了国土免遭来自东面的打击。由于大多数德国人有着坚定的和平主义信仰，直到1990年代，政治上才有了在国外调解纷争时部署德国军队的可能。就在1994年，宪法法院裁定，只有在议会批准之后，德军可以在北约地区之外行动。
It took a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, both with strong pacifist leanings, to send the Bundeswehr into armed combat, thus breaking the post-war taboo. In 1999, Mr Schröder risked a vote of confidence to dispatch fighter planes to take part in NATO's war in Kosovo. Nowadays, Germany is one of the larger providers of peacekeeping troops, with nearly 9,000 men and women spread over a dozen missions that range from Afghanistan to Sudan (see chart).
这样，虽然打破了战后的禁忌，有着强烈和平主义倾向的社会民主党和绿党联合政府还是可以派德军加入武装冲突。1999年，施罗德冒着信任投票的风险火速派出战斗机参加了北约的科索沃战争。如今，德国是维和部队的较大派出国之一，有近9000名男女军人分布在世界各地，自阿富汗延伸至苏丹，正执行十多项任务（见图表）。
Mr Schröder reconciled Germans to the use of military power but without compromising the country's belief in non-military intervention. Armed forces are still seen as one instrument only in dealing with a conflict. In northern Afghanistan, for instance, Germany is testing out a new type of provincial reconstruction team (PRT), which truly mixes military and civil groups. The German PRTs are led jointly by a military commander and a diplomat, and the soldiers are complemented by teams of civil servants and aid workers.
施罗德使德国人认可了在运用军事力量时，不必放弃其非军事干涉的国家信仰。动用武装部队依然被视为仅在处理争端时使用手段。例如，在阿富汗北部，德国试验出了一支新型的地方重建队（PRT），真正混合了军事与平民组织。德国的地方重建队由一名军事指挥官与一名外交官共同领导，文职人员与援助工人队伍为士兵提供补充。
A new sort of German nationalism 新型德国国家主义
Mr Schröder also introduced another novelty into Germany's post-war foreign policy: a kind of German Gaullism. Foreign policy, he insisted, “is decided in Berlin”, and he vowed to defend Germany's interests. This partly explains his opposition to the war in Iraq, an opposition which helped him to get re-elected in 2002, but badly damaged transatlantic relations. His more nationalist approach led to close friendships with the French and Russian presidents, and also to the pursuit of a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.
施罗德也为德国战后的外交政策加入了另外的新创意，即一种“德国戴高乐主义”。他坚称，外交政策“决定于柏林”，他还发誓捍卫德国利益。这部分解释了他反对伊拉克战争的原因，这一反对使他在2002年再度当选，但严重破坏了欧美关系。更为国家主义的态度使他与法俄两国的总统有了亲密的友情，也使他追求德国的安理会常任理事国席位。
As a result, Germany was no longer perceived as a fixed star in the European firmament, let alone stolidly in mid-Atlantic. It was seen to be much freer, prepared to act on its own. Ms Merkel's contribution was to move swiftly to return the perception to what it had been. She has realigned Germany's position, putting some distance between herself and Jacques Chirac, and between herself and Russia's leader, Vladimir Putin, while edging closer to America's president, George Bush.
结果，德国不再被视为欧洲苍穹里的恒星了，更不用说在中大西洋地区徘徊不前。大家也都觉得德国更自由了，准备依自己的意志行事。默克尔为德国迅速恢复其曾有过的地位作出了贡献。她重新调整了德国的位置，不但与希拉克之间，也与俄罗斯领导人普京之间留了点距离，同时向美国总统布什的方向移得更近了。
This effort to reposition Germany has guided her foreign policy. Mr Chirac's frequent hand-kissing notwithstanding, relations with France have cooled significantly. And when Mr Putin visited Germany in October, Ms Merkel did not hesitate to address the murder of a Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya. This was in sharp contrast to Mr Schröder who, during his tenure, called Russia's president “a democrat through and through”.
重新定位德国的努力指导她制定外交政策。尽管希拉克对她频频吻手示好，德法两国的关系仍然显著冷却。普京在10月访问德国，默克尔毫不踌躇，向他提出了记者安娜•波利特科夫斯卡娅（Anna Politkovskaya）的谋杀案。这与施罗德形成了强烈的对比，在施罗德主政期间，他称俄罗斯总统是“完完全全的民主主义者”。
At the same time, she has established an excellent relationship with Mr Bush, though she does not flinch from criticising the United States on such issues as Guantánamo and the CIA “rendition” flights. During her time in the EU presidency, her government would like to start a new transatlantic project. This would be a joint American-EU effort to come up with common standards in such areas as hedge-fund regulation and intellectual property.
与此同时，虽然她并未退缩对美国提出了批评，如关塔那摩（Guantánamo）与中情局的“引渡”航班等问题，但她与布什建立了极好的关系。在她任欧盟轮值主席期间，其政府有可能展开一项新的跨大西洋规划。可能是欧美共同努力，在诸如立法管制套头基金与保护智慧财产权等领域提出共同标准。（译注：hedge-fund“套头基金”，也称“套利基金”，指为弥补某些所持证券贬值的可能性，而持有其他可能升值的证券，以降低风险的一种投资基金。）
An even more important difference between Ms Merkel and her predecessor is her position on EU enlargement, particularly the question of Turkish membership. Mr Schröder was a staunch proponent of Turkish accession, mainly for geopolitical reasons, seeing Turkey as a link between Europe and the Muslim world. Although Ms Merkel wants negotiations to go ahead, she thinks Turkey's relations with the EU should stop short of full membership—a position that is now supported by a large majority of Germans. This could spell trouble within the coalition, since the SPD still wants Turkey inside the union.
默克尔与其前任更为重要的一个不同之处在于她对欧盟扩大的立场，尤其是是否同意土耳其入盟。施罗德坚决同意土耳其加入，主要是处于地缘政治的考量，视其为欧洲与穆斯林世界之间的联系。然而，默克尔想让谈判取得进展，她认为，土耳其与欧盟的关系止于土耳其取得其完全的成员地位——这一立场如今得到绝大多数德国人的支持。由于社民党依然希望土耳其入盟，这将招致联合政府内部的困境。
The quest to become a permanent member of the Security Council has been quietly abandoned, for now. Instead, Germany is playing an important part in foreign issues where it believes it can make a difference. Witness the negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme, in which Germany's involvement, together with the five permanent council members, is signalled by the shorthand “P5 plus one”.
德国不声不响，暂时放弃了寻求成为安理会的常任理事国。代之以在其相信能有不同作为的国际议题上扮演重要角色。例如被简称为“五加一”的机制，即德国与安理会五常共同参与了旨在处理伊朗核问题的谈判。
Germany, says Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, is now pretty much where it belongs: squarely at the centre. Whether it wants to be or not, the country is a Mittelmacht, or middle power. It is not a superpower, able to throw its weight about, but it is in a good position to take responsibility in cases where it can bring something to the table. This is so, for instance, in Central Asia, where Germany is not just the only European country with embassies in all five countries, but has also developed good links with civil society across the region.
德国国际与安全事务研究所（the German Institute for International and Security Affairs）所长Volker Perthes说，德国现在位置恰到好处：正好位于中心。不论其是否希望，德国是中等大国，德语作Mittelmacht。超级大国可以到处发挥其影响力，但德国不行，不过其所处的地位使德国能将一些事情搬上谈判桌，并承担起相应的责任。正是如此，例如，在中亚，德国不仅是在那儿的五国都派驻大使的欧洲国家，也与该地区各国的公民社会发展良好关系。
It is hardly surprising, then, that Germans, so full of domestic gloom, are relatively happy about their current place in the world. But they are warned by Michael Zürn, dean of the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, that this is no reason for self-congratulation. In a recent paper, he tries to assess whether Germany is doing enough to live up to its self-image of being “a power of peace”. His sobering conclusion is not exactly, at least compared with other countries.
此外，几乎不令人惊讶的是，对于内政如此忧虑的德国人都对他们最近在世界上的地位感到相对愉快。但是柏林Hertie管理学院的主任Michael Zürn警告他们说，自我祝贺毫无道理。在最近的一份报纸上，他试图评价，为了配得上其自我定位的“和平力量”形象，德国的作为是否足够。他冷静地得出结论，至少同其他国家比起来，德国做得未必够。
Hesitant power for peace 犹豫不决的和平力量
A direct comparison of Germany's defence spending (1.4% of GDP) with that of the United States (3.7%) is somewhat unfair: the whole point of Germany's foreign policy has been to avoid putting resources mainly in the military basket. But even if you add together the budgets of the ministries of defence, development and foreign affairs, Germany's record is not stellar. This share of “international policy” in Germany's federal budget has dropped from more than 20% in the early 1990s to 12% last year—not just because of less money for defence but also because there is less for development aid. Other indicators confirm that Germany is only a Mittelmacht when it comes to committing resources to development aid.
直接比较德国与美国的国防支出（前者占国民生产总值的1.4％，后者为3.7％），有点儿不公平，因为德国外交政策的总目标避免将军事花销作为资源分配的重点。但是，如果将国防、开发与外事部门的预算累计，德国的记录并不耀眼。德国联邦预算中“国际政策”所占的份额从1990年代之初的超过20％降至去年的12％，不但是由于国防开支减少了，还因为开发援助也更少了。其他的指示者坚持认为，说到将资源投入开发援助，德国仅仅是个Mittelmacht（中等大国）。
They could do with better backing 有了更好的后援，他们会做得不错
Moreover, the number of German troops abroad do not tell the full story. The Bundeswehr has been slow to adapt to a world in which conventional war in defence of the homeland is unlikely. Despite 253,000 soldiers and a budget of euro24 billion ($28 billion), it has a lot of trouble mustering and equipping its peacekeepers. And these troops have rarely been at the centre of the action: in Afghanistan, they stay in the relatively calm north; in Lebanon, they patrol at sea, not on land.
再者，外派德军的数目也不能完整说明情况。Bundeswehr（德国武装部队）适应世界的脚步缓慢，在这个世界，不太可能再用常规战争保家卫国了。尽管有253000名士兵与每年240亿欧元（280亿美元）的预算，征召与装备维和人员的困难仍为数众多。这些维和部队鲜见于军事行动的中心地带：在阿富汗，他们留驻于相对平静的北方；在黎巴嫩，他们则在海上巡逻，不着陆地。
More important in the long run, argues Mr Zürn, is the degree to which foreign-policy questions play a role in Germany's public debates. Though the coverage of international affairs in leading newspapers and broadcasts has increased, particularly when it comes to matters to do with the EU, domestic issues continue to dominate, even more than they do in other European countries. Politicians seem less and less interested in foreign-policy matters that pay no dividends on election day. Of the 109 new members who entered the Bundestag, Germany's parliament, at last year's election, only one admitted to an interest in foreign policy. Nor does it help that Germany is rather short on foreign-policy experts. “Foreign policy has no lobby of its own,” says Mr Perthes.
Zürn认为，长远而言，更为重要的是，对于外交政策问题的公共辩论在德国扮演角色的程度。虽然各大主流报纸与广播媒体对于国际事务的报道增加了，但是，尤其论及欧盟事务时，内政议题继续占据主导地位，更甚于对其他欧洲国家的关注。政客们似乎对于外交政策事务越来越兴趣索然，在选举日，更是置之不理。在德国议会Bundestag的109位新议员中，只有一位承认对外交政策有兴趣。这也无助于德国颇缺乏外交政策专家的现实。皮尔塞斯（Mr Perthes）说，“外交政策没有自己的说客。”
Even though the public seems fairly content, at least for the moment, with the way that foreign policy is going, the country's leaders have not yet done enough to ensure that support will continue for the policy of sending troops abroad. In urging the dispatch of troops to Kosovo, Mr Schröder used strong moral imperatives (“Never again Auschwitz”) to convince the public to allow fighter planes to go into combat. It is hard to follow so emotional an approach with less passionate justifications. There has seldom been any open talk about military dangers. And only low-risk missions are proposed.
至少此时此刻，面对如此的外交政策运作，纵然公众似乎相当满意，在保证国民继续支持对外派兵的政策上，国家领导人仍做得不够。在促使对科索沃派兵时，施罗德使用了强烈的道德强制（“永远别让奥斯维辛的悲剧重演”），以说服公众同意战斗机飞赴战场。如此情绪化的做法而有着更少激昂的辩护，真令人难以置信。德国领导人对军事危险公开发表谈话极为罕见。如果有，仅见于提议参与低风险的任务。
There are obvious reasons for this. Pacifism remains deeply rooted. Moreover, parliament's powers in military matters is a German speciality: even a mission composed of two envoys in Ethiopia must be approved and its mandate renewed annually. But what this means is that, although the public now accepts the need for intervention and peacekeeping, the support is not all that solid. Most people see soldiers as little more than armed development-aid workers, who expend goodwill and good works, but do not get harmed. There may well be a backlash, says Josef Janning of the Bertelsmann Foundation, a think-tank, if something really bad happens, such as a busload of soldiers dying while fighting the Taliban.
出现这种情况的原因很明显。和平主义在德国人的心中依然根深蒂固。再者，议会对军事事务的权力有着德国特质：即使一项在埃塞俄比亚的任务只包括两位特使也要议会批准，并且议会负责每年重新授权。而这意味着，虽然公众现在接受干涉与维和的需求，但其支持不会一直那么稳固。多数人视士兵与武装的开发援助工人无异，他们付出了善意且工作出色，但不会受到伤害。智库贝塔斯曼基金会（the Bertelsmann Foundation）的Josef Janning说，如果真有什么不测，例如在与塔利班的战斗中有一整车的士兵伤亡，很可能会产生（政治上的）强烈反响。
Fortunately, the Bundeswehr has been lucky so far. Since 1991, 64 German soldiers have been killed, most of them by accident. But this state of affairs may not continue. In Afghanistan, for instance, the north is no longer an oasis of calm and German soldiers are regularly attacked. Germans are also discovering that their soldiers can come home as traumatised war veterans, and sometimes do nasty things in action. Witness the uproar created by pictures of German soldiers in Afghanistan holding up skulls. More to the point, NATO allies are turning up the heat on Germany to let its soldiers fight in Afghanistan's much more dangerous south.
幸运的是，德国国防军（Bundeswehr）到目前为止运气都不错。自1991年至今，有64名德国士兵殉职，其中大多数死于意外。但这种参与事务的状态恐难为继。例如，在阿富汗，北方不再是局势平静的绿洲，德国驻军时不时就遭到攻击。德国人也发现，他们的士兵回国的身份成了受创伤的战争退役军人，他们在行动中有时也有龌龊勾当。德国士兵在阿富汗手举骷髅头，并拍照存证，由此引发的丑闻喧嚣一时。对于更多要执行的任务，北约盟国也在为德国加温，让德军承担阿富汗南部更危险得多的战事。
The battlefield is not the only place where the rules of engagement are changing. For Germany, the negotiations with Iran were supposed to be an example of effective multilateralism. But now, with Iran unresponsive, Germany may one day soon have to decide whether it is willing to accept the price of tougher sanctions.
战场不是契约规则不断变化的唯一地点，对于德国而言，与伊朗的谈判该是多边主义行之有效的示例。但现在，伊朗回应冷淡，可能很快会有一天，德国不得不决定是否愿意接受对伊朗更严厉制裁的代价。
And this summer, Germany found that it, too, is not entirely safe from Islamist terrorism, despite its opposition to the war in Iraq. Two Lebanese students placed bombs on regional trains, though these fortunately failed to explode.
今年夏天，尽管反对伊拉克战争，德国也发现自己无法完全免受伊斯兰原教旨恐怖主义者的威胁。两个黎巴嫩学生在地区的火车班车上安放了，然而幸运的是，这些都没爆炸。
For decades, Germany was happy fighting culture wars over nuclear versus renewable energy, while conveniently forgetting that it was increasingly dependent on Russian gas imports. But a recently leaked memo by the foreign ministry's internal think-tank has triggered a heated debate that is reminiscent of discussions about the Soviet Union during the cold war—and also exposes frictions between the foreign ministry and the chancellery. The leaked paper argues that the EU should strengthen its economic and cultural links with Russia, an approach it calls “growing closer by interweaving” (which explains why some have dubbed it a “new Ostpolitik”, given that this was based on the mantra “change through becoming closer”). To critics, this amounts to ignoring both the issue of human rights in Russia, and the danger, for Germany, of energy dependence.
几十年以来，德国在核能与可再生能源之上的文化战打得不亦乐乎，同时，忘了对俄罗斯进口天然气的依赖不断增加。但是，最近外交部的内部智囊团泄漏了一份备忘录，引发了激烈辩论，让人联想起冷战时代对于苏联的讨论，也暴露了外交部与总理之间的抵牾。泄漏出的文件内容认为，欧盟必须加强与俄罗斯之间的经济与文化联系，文件称此做法为“通过紧密结合变得更紧密”（这解释了为什么一些人将其称作“新东方政策”（new Ostpolitik）[译注：Ostpolitik“东方政策”，是曾任联邦德国外长和总理的勃兰特制定和实施的，旨在打开东西方的冷战僵局]，给定的政策基础为“通过变得更紧密而改变”这样的“咒文”）。对于批评者而言，这相当于忽略了两项议题，即俄罗斯的人权以及，对德国而言，能源依赖将带来的危险。
But, at least in the short run, the EU remains the most pressing issue for Germany. Although the government is trying to lower expectations, hopes still run high that Germany can salvage the proposed EU constitution. Yet the presidential election in France next May means that there is not much time, during Germany's six-month presidency, to tackle the issue.
但是，至少就短期而言，对于德国最迫切的议题是欧盟。尽管政府在试图降低预期，但对德国挽救欧盟宪法提案仍然寄予厚望。而法国明年5月就要举行总统选举，这意味着剩下的时间不多了，德国要在历时六个月的轮值主席任内处理此项议题。
In a sense, this presidency will really begin only on March 25th, when leaders of the EU's member states gather in Berlin for the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the union's founding document, and adopt a “Berlin Declaration”. This is supposed to be only a few pages long and drafted in direct talks between governments rather than by the Brussels bureaucracy. The hope is that it will re-launch the union, by stating common values and committing members to a genuine effort on the EU constitution.
在某种意义上，轮值主席的任期从3月25日才真正开始，届时，欧盟成员国的领导人将聚首柏林，纪念欧盟的奠基文件《罗马条约》（the Treaty of Rome）签定50周年，还要通过一份“柏林宣言”（Berlin Declaration）。这份宣言预计只有几页，在政府间举行直接会谈时就可草拟，而不用经过布鲁塞尔的欧盟机构。通过申明共同价值及成员国作出保证，通过真诚的努力制定欧盟宪法，柏林宣言将有望使欧盟重新发动起来。
Germany will need to be more creative than that if it is to accomplish what Ms Merkel calls “squaring the circle”: tweaking the constitutional treaty to make it more acceptable to critics, notably in France, but without obliging the 15 member states that have already ratified it to do so again. Ms Merkel will consult to find out what members can accept, and when decisions would fit into their political schedule. At the EU summit next June, Germany will present a report that outlines how the constitution might be salvaged until France takes over the presidency in 2008.
较之达成默克尔所谓的“处理要务”，德国必须变得更有创意：设法让宪法性条约更能被批评者接受，特别是在法国的那些批评者，但不必责成已经批准条约的15个成员国再批准一次。默克尔将协商确定哪些成员国能够接受，以及决定何时能顺应其国内政治进程。在明年6月的欧盟峰会上，德国将提出一份报告，就2008年法国总统交接前如何挽救欧盟宪法作出概述。
If there is a European leader to find a solution, Ms Merkel may be the one. Among her colleagues, says Gerd Langguth of Bonn University, who has written her biography, she stands out as being extremely rational, wanting to get things done and not making a big fuss about herself. At home, this has become somewhat of a weakness, argues Mr Langguth: she tends to underestimate the importance of emotion in politics and the need to demonstrate leadership. On the international scene, however, it may be a strength: international issues are mostly about interests and law—and not about calming erratic state premiers from Bavaria or North Rhine-Westphalia.
如果有一位欧洲领导人能找到解困之道，恐怕非默克尔莫数了。默克尔传记的作者，波恩大学的Gerd Langguth说，默克尔与她的同事相比，她极为理性，因此显得突出，处理好事情而不会过分自夸。Langguth认为，在国内，这多少成了一个弱点，她倾向于低估政治中情绪的重要性，也对表明领导地位的需要估计不足。然而，换了国际场面，这就成了强项：国际议题大多与利益和法律相关，而非安抚来自巴伐利亚州（Bavaria）或北莱茵-威斯特法伦州（North Rhine-Westphalia）性情乖张的州长。
A successful EU presidency would give her the authority she needs to breathe life into the grand coalition, says Wolfgang Nowak, of the Alfred Herrhausen Society, a think-tank. This would be welcome, for things are not so good at home. Yet, in more than one way, Germany's political system is simply doing what it was built to do after 1945: protect democracy by making it hard to bring about fundamental change. In no other rich country do so many players have a say in how their nation is governed: the state premiers, the coalitions, the constitutional court. Many had hoped that this latest coalition would somehow manage to overcome the “joint-decision-making trap”, bringing the country up to speed with the rest of the world.
智库阿尔弗雷德-何豪森学会（the Alfred Herrhausen Society）的Wolfgang Nowak说，一位成功的欧盟轮值主席会带给她所需的权威，使大联合政府获得生气。能这样大家会拍手称快，毕竟国内的情况没那么好。此外，从各种角度而言，德国的政治体制只是照着1945年之后的建制运作：政治基础难以改变，以此保障民主制度。再没有一个富裕国家有如此之多的政治参与者对他们的国家如何治理有发言权：各州州长、联合政府，及宪法法院。许多人希望，最新的这届联合政府能某种程度成功克服“共同政策制定的怪圈”，带领国家迅速赶上世界先进。
In the coalition's first year, it was probably a good thing that it did not. Not trying too hard to cut the budget deficit encouraged the economy to recover nicely. Growth is likely to reach 2.4%, the highest rate in five years. Unemployment is down by nearly 500,000 on a year ago, to some 4.3m people. And, thanks to booming tax revenues, even the budget deficit is likely to fall to its lowest level since the country's unification 16 years ago.
联合政府上台的第一年，可能什么也不做是件好事。别太急着削减预算赤字以刺激经济复苏，使之表现靓丽。成长率很可能达到2.4％，五年来的最高值。失业人口较之一年前减少近50万，降至430万人。再者，由于税收猛增，就连预算赤字也很可能降至统一16年以来的最低水平。
A tough learning process 艰苦的学习过程
The real problem is that Germans are continuing to lose faith in their political system—mainly as a result of the bickering within the coalition. Both the CDU and the SPD are hovering around 30% in the polls. Worse, according to a recent survey, a majority of Germans now say, for the first time, that they are no longer satisfied with how their democracy works.
真正的问题在于，德国人对他们的政治体制继续丧失信心，主要是联合政府内部争吵不断导致的结果。基民盟与社民党的支持率都徘徊在30％。根据一份最近的调查，更糟糕的是，绝大多数德国人现在认为，他们有史以来第一次对他们民主体制的运作不再满意。
Such a snapshot should not be misread: Germans are not about to ditch democracy. But there is a danger that, unhappy about direction, they may rediscover isolationism. Already, Euroscepticism is on the rise. And two-thirds of Germans now think that their soldiers should not be sent on any new missions. “Germans are still learning that they have to take over more responsibility,” says a top official at the chancellery. “The problem could become that the world will ask us to do too much at this stage of our learning process.” Germany has made great progress at finding its place in the world since unification, but it is not yet over the hump of history.
不能将如此一瞥误读：德国人并非要抛弃民主制度。但他们对制度的方向不满，有重新复活孤立主义的危险。“欧洲怀疑主义”（Euroscepticism）思潮业已在涨。现在，有2/3的德国人认为，不该再派他们的士兵参与任何任务了。总理府的一位高级官员说，“德国人仍在学习，他们必须承担更多责任。在我们学习过程中的这一阶段，要是世界要求我们做得太多，那么这就可能形成问题。”自东西德统一，德国就在世界舞台上寻找其合适的位置，如今已经取得了巨大进步，但德国还并未跨越历史的驼峰。翻译 by 福建李菁
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